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Abstract: Scientists often think of the world (or some part of it) as a dynamical system, 
a stochastic process, or a generalization of such a system. Prominent examples of 
systems are (i) the system of planets orbiting the sun or any other classical mechanical 
system, (ii) a hydrogen atom or any other quantum-mechanical system, and (iii) the 
earth’s atmosphere or any other statistical mechanical system. We introduce a general 
and unified framework for describing such systems and show how it can be used to 
examine some familiar philosophical questions, including the following: how can we 
define nomological possibility, necessity, determinism, and indeterminism; what are 
symmetries and laws; what regularities must a system display to make scientific 
inference possible; how might principles of parsimony such as Occam’s Razor help 
when we make such inferences; what is the role of space and time in a system; and 
might they be emergent features? Our framework is intended to serve as a toolbox for 
the formal analysis of systems that is applicable in several areas of philosophy.   
1. Introduction 
For both scientific and philosophical purposes, we often find it useful to think of the 
world (or some part of it that we are studying) as a system evolving over time: a 
dynamical system, a stochastic process, or a suitable generalization of such a system. 
In both science and philosophy, many theories represent the world (or the part they are 
concerned with) in terms of such systems, with various structures and properties. 
Metaphysical commitments often take the form of claims about the nature of those 
structures and properties: which of them are real and not just artefacts of our models, 
which are fundamental as opposed to derivative, and which are necessary as opposed 
to contingent.  
In this paper, we introduce a general and unified framework for describing systems, 
based on the theory of dynamical systems and stochastic processes, and show how this 
framework can be used to examine and illuminate some familiar philosophical 
questions. Here are some examples: 
• What does it mean for a system to be deterministic or indeterministic, and which 
features of the system, if any, determine which others?  
• Does the present determine the future? Does it determine the past? What is the 
smallest set of facts encoding the system’s entire history? Could there be non-
temporal forms of determinism? 
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• How can we define nomological possibility and necessity for a system? 
• What are the laws governing a particular system, and is there a distinction 
between “laws” and “brute necessities”? How do laws depend on symmetries?  
• What structure must a system have in order to permit generalizations from local 
observations to global regularities?  
• How might we use principles of parsimony such as Occam’s Razor when we 
make such generalizations? And can we formulate a version of Occam’s Razor 
in terms of symmetries?  
• What is the role of space and time in a system? What is the relationship between 
the geometry of space and time and the system’s behaviour?  
• Is this spatiotemporal geometry exogenous, or is it determined by the dynamics? 
In other words, are space and time more fundamental than the system’s 
dynamics, or the other way around? Might space and time be “emergent”? 
• How should we individuate systems? Should two structurally indistinguishable 
systems count as “the same”, or might they count as different? 
For each of these questions, our framework allows us to identify in clear and precise 
terms what is at stake. We illustrate the generality of the framework by sketching how 
it can accommodate, schematically, the systems described by some standard physical 
theories, such as classical mechanics, electrodynamics, quantum mechanics, and 
special and general relativity. In principle, our framework can also be used to describe 
many systems studied in the special sciences, such as biological, social, and economic 
systems, though we do not have the space to develop these applications here. We make 
a few remarks about special-science systems at the end of the paper and hope that our 
framework will serve as a basis for future work in some of those areas.1  
The paper is structured as follows. We discuss three classes of systems, in increasing 
order of generality. We call the first temporally evolving systems (Section 2), the second 
spatially extended systems (Section 3), and the third amorphous systems (Section 4). 
We offer a conceptual toolbox for describing and analysing each class of systems, 
covering notions such as states and histories, determinism and indeterminism, 
nomological possibility and necessity, modal and probabilistic properties, symmetries 
and laws, ergodicity and its significance in making scientific inference possible, 
Occam’s Razor, and the role of time and/or space. We first explain all of these notions 
in the context of the simplest class of systems (in Section 2) and then generalize from 
there (in Sections 3 and 4). The paper also includes some more technical appendices, 
on factor systems (relevant to the analysis of systems at different levels of abstraction), 
on partial and local symmetries (relevant to “local” laws and the analysis of systems 
with special initial or boundary conditions), on criteria of parsimony in relation to 
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Juarrero (1999), and Silberstein and Chemero (2012). 
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which symmetries to postulate (relevant to Occam’s Razor), and on the definition of 
spatial distance in quantum-mechanical systems (which raises special challenges).  
Although the paper presupposes a willingness to engage with technical material – and 
a basic familiarity with science will be helpful – our goal is to keep the exposition as 
simple and self-contained as possible. Our intended contribution is twofold: 
methodological and substantive. On the methodological side, we aim to offer a unified 
and yet accessible framework for the philosophical analysis of many of the systems 
studied in the sciences. While the basic ideas originate from the theory of dynamical 
systems and stochastic processes in mathematics and physics, and partially overlapping 
formalisms can be found in earlier works (e.g., by Earman 1986, van Fraassen 1989, 
Berkovitz, Frigg, and Kronz 2006, 2011, Werndl 2009a, 2009b, Bishop 2011, 
Butterfield 2012, and Yoshimi 2012), the key ideas remain underappreciated in 
philosophy, and to our knowledge, an equally unified (and, we think, accessible) 
framework is not yet available in the philosophical literature.  
On the substantive side, we aim to offer a number of novel insights, for example 
concerning (i) the nature of nomological possibility and necessity in a system and the 
definition of determinism and indeterminism, (ii) the role of symmetries in 
distinguishing between “laws” and “brute necessities” in a system, (iii) the significance 
of symmetries and ergodicity as prerequisites for scientific inference, (iv) the 
relationship between Occam’s Razor and the symmetries of a system, and (v) the 
possibility that the topology and geometry of space and time may be emergent 
properties resulting from a system’s correlation structure. These, we hope, will be 
useful substantive contributions, over and above the paper’s unificatory contribution.  
2. Temporally evolving systems 
2.1 Basic definitions 
We begin with the simplest class of systems whose states evolve over time.2 To define 
a system in this class, we need to specify what time is, what the system’s states are, and 
how these states may evolve over time. Time is represented by a set of points T that is 
linearly ordered; we write < for the “before” relation. The state of the system at each 
point in time is given by an element of some state space X. For the moment, we make 
no assumptions about the internal structure of the states in X; they are uninterpreted 
primitives. A history of the system, capturing “state evolution”, is a path through the 
state space, represented by a function h from T into X. For each time t in T, h(t) is the 
system’s state at time t. In a physical system, each state might be a completely specified 
microphysical state in which the system could be at a particular point in time, and 
histories would be possible trajectories of the system through its state space over time.   
We write W to denote the set of all histories deemed possible. Histories play the role of 
possible worlds. Thus, the structure of W reflects the notion of possibility we wish to 
capture. If we are interested in logical possibility, then W is simply the set of all 
logically possible functions from T into X, which we call H. If we are interested in some 
form of nomological possibility, such as physical possibility, W will often be a proper 
subset of H. Our intended interpretation of possibility throughout this paper is the 
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nomological one, since we want to distinguish between histories that are permitted by 
the laws governing our system and histories that are not.  
Subsets of W are called events. We can apply logical operations to events. The 
conjunction of two events E and E' is given by their intersection E ∩ E'. Their 
disjunction is given by their union E È E'. The negation of an event E is given by its 
complement ~E = W\E. Later we introduce possibility and necessity operators. 
To complete the definition of a temporally evolving system, we must define probabilities 
on W. Formally, we introduce a conditional probability structure.3 This is a family of 
conditional probability functions {PrE}EÍW, consisting of one PrE for each event E in 
W, where PrE assigns to any event in W the conditional probability of that event, given 
E.4 The family must satisfy certain consistency conditions, such as compatibility with 
Bayesian conditionalization.5 Now, a temporally evolving system is the pair consisting 
of the set W of possible histories and the conditional probability structure {PrE}EÍW. 
For example, in a weather system, X would be the set of all possible weather states and 
W the set of all possible weather histories. For each particular weather event E, say a 
hot temperature on Monday, the function PrE assigns to every weather event D, say a 
thunderstorm on Tuesday, the conditional probability of its occurrence, given E.  
In principle, the probability structure admits two interpretations. Under an objectivist 
interpretation, it is a feature of the system itself and thus represents objective chance 
(see, e.g., Lewis 1986, Schaffer 2007, and List and Pivato 2015). Of course, objective 
chance could be degenerate, i.e., restricted to the extremal values 0 or 1. Degenerate 
objective chance is a much-discussed feature of deterministic systems; we return to this 
point later. Under a subjectivist interpretation, the probability structure is not a feature 
of the system itself, but represents an observer’s beliefs about the system, as in 
subjective Bayesianism (e.g., de Finetti 1972). The most natural way to read this paper 
is to assume the objectivist interpretation, though our formalism itself is neutral.  
Familiar examples of temporally evolving systems are the system of planets orbiting 
the sun or any other classical mechanical system, a hydrogen atom or any other 
quantum-mechanical system, the earth’s climate system or any other statistical 
mechanical system, and (arguably) the global economy or some other closed macro-
economic system. Generally, any classical dynamical system is a special case of a 
temporally evolving system, as is any stochastic process under the standard definition.6 
                                               
3 Conditional probability structures have previously been considered by several authors, e.g., Popper 
(1968), Renyi (1955), van Fraassen (1976), as reviewed in Halpern (2010). 
4 Each PrE is defined on a suitable s-algebra A(W) on W; we set the technicalities aside. For any E ¹ Æ, 
PrE has the standard properties of a probability measure. But, for technical reasons, PrÆ(D) = 1 for all D. 
5 For any subsets CÍDÍEÍW, we have PrE(C) = PrE(D) ´ PrD(C). Also, PrD(E) = 1 for all DÍEÍW. 
6 A classical dynamical system consists of a set X (the state space) and a function f from X into itself that 
determines how the state changes over time (the dynamics). Let T={0,1,2,3,....}. Given any state x in X 
(the initial conditions), the orbit of x is the history h defined by h(0) = x, h(1) = f(x), h(2) = f(f(x)), and 
so on. Let W be the set of all orbits determined by (X, f) in this way. Let {Pr'E}EÍX be any conditional 
probability structure on X. For any events E and D in W, we define PrE(D) = Pr'E'(D'), where E' and D' 
are the sets of all states in X whose orbits lie in E and D, respectively. Then {PrE}EÍW is a conditional 
probability structure on W. Thus, W and {PrE}EÍW together form a temporally evolving system. However, 
not every temporally evolving system arises in this way. While classical dynamical systems are 
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For theoretical simplicity, we focus on closed systems, which are not subject to any 
external perturbations. However, one could also represent open systems in our 
framework, by encoding any external perturbations as additional sources of randomness 
in the system’s conditional probability structure (“random forcings”).7 
2.2 Determinism and indeterminism 
Conventionally, a system is called deterministic if, in that system, the past always 
determines the future. Formally, for any history h and any point in time t, let ht be the 
initial segment of that history up to t. This is the function h restricted to the points in 
time up to t. History h is deterministic if, at any time t in T, the initial segment ht admits 
only one possible continuation in W, where a continuation of ht is a history h' such that 
h't = ht. History h is indeterministic if, for some time t, ht has more than one possible 
continuation in W. The system as a whole is called deterministic if all histories in W are 
deterministic, and indeterministic if some histories in W are indeterministic.8  
For example, classical mechanical systems, such as the solar system on the Newtonian 
picture, are deterministic. By contrast, quantum-mechanical systems, such as a 
decaying uranium atom, are indeterministic (assuming no hidden variables). If the wave 
function, which encodes the state of the quantum system, collapses at time t, the initial 
segment ht of the system’s history h can admit multiple continuations. 
Indeterministic systems allow non-degenerate chance as we move along a given history, 
while deterministic systems do not.9 To see this, note that the chance of any event E in 
history h at time t is the conditional probability of E, given that the initial segment ht 
has occurred. Since the event that the initial segment ht has occurred is given by the set 
                                               
deterministic, temporally evolving systems also subsume stochastic processes. Formally, a stochastic 
process is a temporally indexed collection of random variables {Xt : t Î T} (with T as before) on some 
probability space (W, A(W), Pr), where W is some underlying (abstract) set of possible worlds, A(W) is a 
s-algebra on W, and Pr is a probability measure on A(W). For each time t, we can think of the random 
variable Xt as expressing the state of the stochastic process at t. To see that this gives rise to a temporally 
evolving system, note that each world w in W induces a history h in our sense, where, for each t, h(t) is 
the realization of Xt at world w. Most of the conditional probability structure {PrE}EÍW can then be 
derived from Pr via Bayes rule, but {PrE}EÍW may contain some additional information not encoded in 
Pr (namely, conditional probabilities arising from zero-probability events). In Sections 3 and 4, we 
extend our framework to even more general classes of systems. 
7 The use of such random forcings does not imply that certain features of the world are genuinely random. 
Instead, the “randomness” of such forcings is best understood epistemically – as a shortcut for an explicit 
and detailed description of the part of the world which lies outside the model. (This is true whether we 
adopt an objectivist or subjectivist interpretation of the probability structure overall.)  
8 On these definitions, see also List (2014) and List and Pivato (2015). Related definitions of determinism 
(broadly, in terms of a history’s unique extendibility based on an initial state or segment) can be found, 
for instance, in van Fraassen (1989, section 10.4) and Butterfield (2012). See also the classic overview 
in Earman (1986) and the discussion of varieties of determinism in Sobel (1998). Earman shares our 
focus on local-to-global determination, as noted below. While Sobel discusses more than 90 variants of 
determinism, he frames the question differently than us. First of all, his focus, unlike ours in this paper, 
is on the free-will debate. Secondly, for us, the central question is (roughly): does the complete 
specification of the world (history) for a particular space-time region (e.g., a history’s initial segment) 
determine a complete specification of that world (history) for other space-time regions? By contrast, for 
Sobel, the central question is (roughly): does an event that occurs at a particular space-time location have 
a cause at some antecedent space-time location? Since we do not explicitly discuss the topic of causation 
here, Sobel’s analysis and ours are not immediately inter-translatable.  
9 For discussion, see, e.g., Schaffer (2007) and List and Pivato (2015). 
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of all continuations of ht – call this set [ht] – the probability in question is Pr[ht](E). If 
history h is deterministic, the entire conditional probability function Pr[ht] is degenerate, 
i.e., it assigns probability 0 or 1 to every event E. This is because the initial segment ht 
has only one continuation, namely h itself, and so the specified event [ht] contains only 
a single history, h. Then Pr[ht](E) is 1 if h belongs to E and 0 otherwise. In contrast, if 
history h is indeterministic, Pr[ht] may be non-degenerate, assigning probabilities 
strictly between 0 and 1 to some events E. This is because [ht] need not be singleton 
here, and so Pr[ht] is less constrained. (For the moment, we set aside phenomena such 
as “higher-level” indeterminism and chance, as discussed in List and Pivato 2015. We 
briefly consider such phenomena at the end of this paper.) 
Our framework also allows us to formulate some more general, less familiar notions of 
determinism. For any subset T' of T – not just the set of time points up to a particular 
time t – we can ask whether the restriction of a given history to the points in T' uniquely 
determines the rest of that history. Let hT' denote the restriction of the function h to T'. 
Our question, then, is whether hT' has a unique extension to all of T in W, where an 
extension of hT' is a history h' such that h'T' = hT'. If there is a unique extension, history 
h may be called T'-deterministic.10   
We might ask, for instance, whether the entire history of a system, both past and future, 
is determined by its present state alone. Similarly, we might ask whether, given the 
states of the system at two points in time, there is a unique history connecting them. So, 
one can in principle consider not only the familiar idea of “past-to-future” determinism, 
but also other forms of “local-to-global” determinism. In Section 3.2, we develop these 
ideas further and consider, among other things, spatial rather than temporal forms of 
determinism as well as locally restricted ones. 
2.3 Nomological possibility and necessity 
We can explicitly define the notions of nomological necessity and possibility in our 
framework.11 Intuitively, an event E is nomologically possible in history h at time t if 
the initial segment of that history up to t admits at least one continuation in W that lies 
in E; and E is nomologically necessary in h at t if every continuation of the history’s 
initial segment up to t lies in E.  
More formally, we say that one history, h', is accessible from another, h, at time t if the 
initial segments of h and h' up to time t coincide, i.e., ht = ht'. We then write hRth'. The 
binary relation Rt on possible histories is in fact an equivalence relation (reflexive, 
symmetric, and transitive). Now, an event E Í W is nomologically possible in history h 
at time t if some history h' in W that is accessible from h at t is contained in E. Similarly, 
an event E Í W is nomologically necessary in history h at time t if every history h' in W 
that is accessible from h at t is contained in E.  
We can thus define two modal operators, ut and nt, to represent possibility and 
necessity at time t. We define each of them as a mapping from events to events. For 
any event E Í W,  
                                               
10 For related ideas, see also van Fraassen (1989, section 10.4). 
11 We here employ, and subsequently generalize, a construction from List (2014). 
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ut E = {h Î W : for some h' Î W with hRth', we have h' Î E}, 
nt E = {h Î W : for all h' Î W with hRth', we have h' Î E}. 
So, ut E is the set of all histories in which E is possible at time t, and nt E is the set of 
all histories in which E is necessary at time t. Accordingly, we say that ut E holds in 
history h if h is an element of ut E, and nt E holds in h if h is an element of nt E. As 
one would expect, the two modal operators are duals of each other: for any event E Í W, 
we have nt E = ~ut ~E and ut E = ~nt ~E.  
Two remarks are due. First, although we have here defined nomological possibility and 
necessity, we can analogously define logical possibility and necessity. To do this, we 
must simply replace every occurrence of the set W of nomologically possible histories 
in our definitions with the set H of logically possible histories. Second, by defining the 
operators ut and nt as functions from events to events, we have adopted a semantic 
definition of these modal notions. However, one could also describe them syntactically, 
by introducing an explicit modal logic. For each point in time t, the logic corresponding 
to the operators ut and nt would then be an instance of a standard S5 modal logic (on 
S5, see, e.g., Priest 2001).  
Our analysis shows how nomological possibility and necessity depend on the dynamics 
of the system, as evident from the time-indexed nature of the relevant modal operators. 
In particular, as time progresses, the notion of possibility becomes more demanding: 
fewer events remain possible at each time. And the notion of necessity becomes less 
demanding: more events become necessary at each time, for instance due to having 
been “settled” in the past. Formally, for any t and t' in T with t < t' and any event E Í W, 
if   ut' E  then ut E,  
 if   nt E   then  nt' E. 
Furthermore, in a deterministic system, for every event E and any time t, we have 
ut E = nt E. In other words, an event is possible in any history h at time t if and only if 
it is necessary in h at t. In an indeterministic system, by contrast, necessity and 
possibility come apart. 
Just as we previously discussed different notions of determinism – not just “past to 
future” but also “local to global” – so we can generalize the notions of possibility and 
necessity in a similar way. Let us say that one history, h', is accessible from another, h, 
relative to a set T' of time points, if the restrictions of h and h' to T' coincide, i.e., 
h'T' = hT'. We then write hRT'h'. Accessibility at time t is the special case where T' is the 
set of points in time up to time t. We can define nomological possibility and necessity 
relative to T' as follows. For any event E Í W,  
uT' E = {h Î W : for some h' Î W with hRT'h', we have h' Î E}, 
nT' E = {h Î W : for all h' Î W with hRT'h', we have h' Î E}. 
Although these modal notions are much less familiar than the standard ones (possibility 
and necessity at time t), they are useful for some purposes. In particular, they allow us 
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to express the fact that the states of a system during a particular period of time, T' Í T, 
render some events E possible or necessary. 
Finally, our definitions of possibility and necessity relative to some general subset T' 
of T allow us to define completely “atemporal” notions of possibility and necessity. If 
we take T' to be the empty set, then the accessibility relation RT' becomes the universal 
relation, under which every history is related to every other. An event E is possible in 
this atemporal sense (i.e., uÆE) if and only if E is a non-empty subset of W, and it is 
necessary in this atemporal sense (i.e., nÆE) if E coincides with all of W. These notions 
might be viewed as possibility and necessity from the perspective of some observer 
who has no temporal or historical location within the system and looks at it from the 
outside. 
2.4 Modal and probabilistic properties 
Ultimately, all modal properties of a temporally evolving system are encoded by the set 
W of nomologically possible histories, and all probabilistic properties are encoded by 
the conditional probability structure {PrE}EÍW. This raises the question: which, if any, 
of these properties qualify as “laws” of the system, and what does this mean? 
One possible view is that: 
• any property that is satisfied by all histories in W counts as a law of the system, 
specifically a “modal law”; and  
• any property of the conditional probability structure {PrE}EÍW counts as a law 
of the system, specifically a “probabilistic law”.  
Indeed, since the system is fully specified by W and {PrE}EÍW, one might interpret 
anything that is globally true of its possible histories or its probability structure as a law 
of that system. A view along these lines is expressed in a classic paper by Sellars (1948, 
p. 309): “A natural law is a universal proposition, implicative in form, which holds of 
all histories of a family of possible histories; as such it is distinguished from ‘accidental’ 
formal implications which hold of one or more possible histories of the family, but do 
not hold of all.” So, the notions “being a law” and “being nomologically necessary” 
essentially coincide. 
Against this view, however, we want to argue that even among nomologically necessary 
properties of a system – those that are not contingent on particular histories – one can 
distinguish between “laws” on the one hand and “brute necessities”, which are not law-
like, on the other. Laws, we suggest, have a testable and generalizable character which 
brute necessities lack. To explain this, we introduce two preliminary notions, properties 
of histories and probabilistic properties, and then provide a criterion for identifying 
which of them qualify as laws.  
A property of histories, P, is a binary feature that a history may or may not have. 
Formally, it can be associated with some subset, denoted [P], of the set H of all logically 
possible histories. A history h satisfies P if h belongs to [P]. We call [P] the extension 
of P. A property satisfied by every history in W can be called nomologically necessary 
for the system. Newton’s three laws of motion are examples of such properties in the 
case of a classical mechanical system.   
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A probabilistic property, P, is a binary feature that a conditional probability structure 
may or may not have. Formally, it is associated with a subset, denoted [P], of the set P 
of all logically possible conditional probability structures on W. A conditional 
probability structure {PrE}EÍW satisfies P if it belongs to [P]. We call [P] the extension 
of P. An example of a probabilistic property is the one that says: “The unconditional 
probability of event F is ½.” Its extension is the set of all conditional probability 
structures {PrE}EÍW for which PrW(F) = ½. Another example is the second law of 
thermodynamics. This is a probabilistic property that is satisfied by the conditional 
probability structure of a statistical mechanical system.   
Our goal is to distinguish between those properties that qualify as “laws” of the system 
and those that do not. We capture that distinction through the notion of symmetries. 
Informally, a symmetry is a transformation that acts on either the state space X or the 
set of time points T, or both, and which can capture certain admissible changes in 
perspective on the system. Laws, we suggest, are those nomologically necessary 
properties which are invariant under symmetries and which therefore hold across 
changes in perspective. We now make this formally precise. 
2.5 Symmetries 
We first consider symmetries acting on the state space; we then turn to symmetries 
acting on time; and we finally consider more general symmetries. To introduce state 
symmetries, we begin with some preliminary definitions. Let f be any function from X 
into itself, i.e., a transformation on the state space. We use this transformation to define 
a function from histories to other histories. For reasons that will become clear, we do 
not restrict the function to nomologically possible histories, but define it as a function 
on H, the set of all logically possible histories. Specifically, for any history h in H, we 
define the transformed history  
f(h) = h', where, for all t in T, h'(t) = f(h(t)). 
For example, if X={a,b,c,d,…,z}, the function f might shift every letter in the alphabet 
one place to the right, i.e., a to b, b to c, and so on, and z back to a. If we represent 
histories as sequences of elements in X, interpreted as the system’s states at times 1, 2, 
3, …, then applying f to the history h = (b,a,c,f,z,…) yields the history h' = 
(c,b,d,g,a,…). For convenience, we use the letter f to denote both the original function 
on the state space and the induced function on the set H of histories. Note that since the 
set of nomologically possible histories may be a proper subset of the set of all logically 
possible histories, the image of a history in W need not be in W. 
To define what it means for f to be a symmetry, we need one further preliminary 
definition. For any collection of histories E in H, the inverse image of E under f is the 
set of all histories h in H such that f(h) lies in E.12 For example, if E is the set of all 
histories whose state at time 3 is c, and f is the letter-shifting transformation, then the 
inverse image of E under f is the set of all histories whose state at time 3 is b. Now, the 
function f is a symmetry of our system if 
                                               
12 Formally, we write f–1(E) ={h in H: f(h) is in E}. The use of this notation for inverse images of sets 
does not imply that the function f is invertible. Moreover, the inverse image of an event E could be 
empty, namely if none of the histories in E can be “reached” as transformations of other histories. 
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• f(W) = W, i.e., (i) f(h) is in W, for all h in W, and (ii) for any h in W, there is 
some h' in W such that f(h') = h; and 
• for any events E and D in W, if E' and D' are the inverse images of E and D 
under f, then PrE'(D') = PrE(D).13  
Intuitively, a symmetry is a transformation that preserves the system’s modal and 
probabilistic structure. In our example, where X={a,b,c,d,…,z} and f is the letter-
shifting function, the first part of this definition implies that the set of nomologically 
possible histories is preserved under shifting of letters. For instance, if (b,a,c,f,z,…) is 
a nomologically possible history, then so is (c,b,d,g,a,…).14 To illustrate the second 
part, let E be the set of all histories in W whose state at time 3 is c, and let D be the set 
of all histories in W whose state at time 5 is a (so that E' is a suitable set of histories 
whose state at time 3 is b, and D' is a suitable set of histories whose state at time 5 is 
z).15 The conditional probability that the state of a history at time 5 is a, given that at 
time 3 it is c, must then equal the conditional probability that the state at time 5 is z, 
given that at time 3 it is b. 
Obviously, not all state transformations are symmetries. Whether there are any non-
trivial state symmetries depends on the system in question, i.e., it depends on W and 
{PrE}EÍW. In classical mechanical systems, state symmetries include spatial translations, 
which shift everything in a certain direction by a certain distance, rotations and 
reflections, and permutations of particles with equal mass. Those transformations 
preserve the modal and probabilistic structure of the relevant systems.  
Similarly, we can define time symmetries. Again, we begin with some preliminary 
definitions. Let y be any function on T, i.e., a transformation on time. For any history 
h, we define the transformed history  
y(h) = h', where, for all t in T, h'(t) = h(y(t)).16 
For example, if T = {1,2,3,…}, the function y might be given by y(t) = t + 5 for all t 
in T. It maps the history (x1, x2, x3, …) (a sequence of states across time) to the 
history (x6, x7, x8, …). As in the case of state symmetries, y induces a function from the 
set H to itself. In analogy to the earlier definition, y is a symmetry if 
• y(W) = W; 
• for any events E and D in W, if E' and D' are the inverse images of E and D 
under y, then PrE' (D') = PrE(D). 
                                               
13 Strictly speaking, {PrE}EÍW is only defined for subsets of W. But we can extend it as follows: for any 
D, E Í H, if E ∩ W ≠ Æ, let PrE(D) = PrE∩W(D∩W). Cases where E ∩ W = Æ are not relevant here, 
because of the first bullet point in the definition of symmetry. 
14 And further, there is a nomologically possible history, namely (a,z,b,e,y,…), such that applying the 
letter-shifting function to it yields the history (b,a,c,f,z,…). 
15 Formally, E' consists of all the histories h in H such that f(h) is in W and h(3) = b. Similarly, D' consists 
of all the histories h in H such that f(h) is in W and h(5) = z. 
16 Typically, we require y to be order-preserving, i.e., for all t and t' in T, if t < t', then y(t) < y(t'). For 
example, if T = {1,2,3,…} with the standard ordering, the functions y(t) = t + 5 and y(t) = 5t are order-
preserving. But we do not build this requirement into our definition of a time symmetry. Note that some 
time symmetries, such as time reversals in classical physical systems, are not order-preserving. 
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In our example, where T = {1,2,3,…} and y(t) = t + 5, the first part of this definition 
implies that if h = (x1, x2, x3,…) is a nomologically possible history of the system, then 
so is h' = (x6, x7, x8,…).17 To illustrate the second part, suppose that E is the set of all 
histories in W whose state at time 3 is c, while D is the set of all histories in W whose 
state at time 4 is a (so that E' is a suitable set of histories whose state at time 8 is c, 
while D' is a suitable set of histories whose state at time 9 is a). The conditional 
probability that the state at time 9 is a, given that at time 8 it was c, must then equal the 
conditional probability that the state at time 4 is a, given that at time 3 it was c.18 
Just as not all state transformations are symmetries, so not all time transformations are 
symmetries either. In most classical physical systems, time symmetries include time 
translations, such as y(t) = t+5, but exclude non-linear transformations, such as 
y(t) = t2. In systems where the state does not encode explicitly “kinetic” properties (such 
as momentum), simple time reversals, such as y(t) = –t, can also be time symmetries. 
For example, the partial differential equations describing wave propagation in an ideal 
medium are invariant under simple time reversals. But many other systems, such as 
thermodynamic ones and diffusion processes, do not admit such simple time reversals. 
More general symmetries include composite functions resulting from the combination 
of transformations of X and transformations of T. These are best understood as functions 
acting on the set H of logically possible histories directly, with the properties introduced 
above. A familiar example in classical mechanical systems is a time reversal, which 
involves both a negation of the time index and a negation of all momentum vectors in 
the system (not to be confused with a simple time reversal, as mentioned earlier).19 A 
more complex example is a Galilean transformation, which adds a constant vector to 
the momentum vectors of all particles and also a time-varying sequence of spatial shifts 
to the particle positions, thereby converting the system to a different inertial reference 
frame. See footnote 48 below for details. 
We can think of symmetries – whether they act on the state space, on time, or on both 
– as transformations that encode admissible changes in perspective on a system, insofar 
as they preserve the system’s modal and probabilistic structure. We write Y to denote 
the set of all symmetries of our temporally evolving system. This set has the algebraic 
                                               
17 And further, there is some nomologically possible history h'' = (u, v, w, y, z, x1, x2, x3,…) such that 
shifting the system’s state in h'' five time periods into the future yields the history h. (Here, the exact 
values of u, v, w, y, z are irrelevant, as long as h'' is nomologically possible.) 
18 Note that classical dynamical systems have a particularly rich set of time symmetries. Let (X, f) be a 
dynamical system, as defined in footnote 6. Suppose the function f (which maps from X into itself) is 
surjective, i.e., for all x in X, there is some y in X such that f(y)=x. Then the set W of orbits is invariant 
under all time-shifts. Let {Pr'E}EÍX be a conditional probability structure on X, and let {PrE}EÍW be the 
conditional probability structure it induces on W. Suppose that {Pr'E}EÍX is f-invariant, i.e., for any 
subsets E and D of X, if E' = f–1(E) and D' = f–1(D), then Pr'E'(D') = Pr'E(D). Then every time shift is a 
temporal symmetry of the resulting temporally evolving system. The study of dynamical systems 
equipped with invariant probability measures is the purview of ergodic theory. 
19 As Roberts (2013) has argued, in general, a time reversal must not only map the time coordinate t to 
–t, but also apply an appropriate transformation to the system’s state at each point in time (in special 
cases, this could be the identity transformation, as in the case of a simple time reversal). Generally, we 
can think of the state of the system at each point in time as encoding not only some “static” properties 
(such as each particle’s position), but also some “kinetic” properties (such as each particle’s momentum). 
While static properties are preserved under time reversals, kinetic properties are not generally preserved. 
Similarly, in quantum mechanics, time reversals involve not only a reversal of the time coordinate, but 
also taking the conjugate of the wave function’s values. 
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structure of a monoid. Formally, a monoid is a set of transformations (here of H) which 
(i) contains the identity transformation (mapping every history to itself) and (ii) is 
closed under composition (i.e., for any two transformations in the set, the 
transformation obtained by applying first one of the two transformations and then the 
other is also in the set). An example of a symmetry monoid is the set of all rotations of 
a classical mechanical system around a fixed axis: the identity transformation obviously 
belongs to this set, being a rotation by an angle of zero, and the composition of any two 
rotations is still a rotation.20  
2.6 Laws and their significance 
As anticipated, the laws of a system are those nomologically necessary properties 
within it that are invariant under symmetries. This, we show, makes laws open to testing 
and generalization. Laws, one might say, have a “scrutable” and “projectable” character. 
The close relationship between symmetries and laws has been recognized before.21 For 
instance, Wigner (1967) takes symmetries to be “a prerequisite for the very possibility 
of discovering the laws of nature” (as Brading and Castellani 2013 put it; see also 
French 2014). And van Fraassen (1989), in his classic study of symmetries in science, 
considers defining laws as “facts which are invariant under symmetries”, though 
ultimately does not endorse that definition. But none of the existing accounts clarifies 
the relationship between laws and symmetries in a way that we consider fully 
satisfactory.22 We develop this relationship in detail in the case of modal laws. We 
subsequently consider probabilistic laws too, but, due to space constraints, discuss 
those more briefly.  
To define the notion of a modal law, consider a property of histories, P. Recall that P 
is nomologically necessary for the given system if its extension, [P], includes all 
histories in W. For any symmetry y, we say that P is invariant under y if the set [P] is 
                                               
20 To see that the set Y of all symmetries of a temporally evolving system forms a monoid, note that (i) 
the identity transformation is trivially a symmetry, and (ii) if two transformations each qualify as 
symmetries, by preserving the modal and probabilistic structure of the system, then so does their 
composition. If all symmetries are invertible, then Y becomes a group, but we need not assume this. 
21 See, e.g., Wigner (1967), van Fraassen (1989, Part III), Mainzer (1996, Section 5.3), Brading and 
Castellani (2003, 2013), and Baker (2010). 
22 For example, Wigner (1967) recognizes the centrality of laws to scientific discovery, but does not 
define laws as facts that are invariant under symmetry. Instead, he seems to regard symmetry invariance 
principles as “second-order laws”, which relate laws to other laws (or which relate a law to itself). So, 
for him, it appears that laws establish relationships between events, and symmetries establish 
relationships between laws. Van Fraassen’s analysis (1989) is in many ways a precursor to ours (see, 
e.g., ibid., Section 11.2). But surprisingly he seems to reject the definition of laws as “facts invariant 
under symmetries” (ibid., Section 11.5). His proposed counterexamples (inspired by a passage from 
Weyl 1952) involve symmetry-invariant facts which are not nomologically necessary (such as the 
number of planets in the solar system). In contrast, we define laws as nomologically necessary facts 
which are invariant under symmetries. Mainzer (1996) alludes to the connection between symmetry and 
simplicity (esp. on p. 580), but does not offer a precise formal analysis. Brading and Castellani (2013) 
discuss the importance of symmetry in modern physics, but do not propose symmetry as a criterion for 
scientific law. Finally, Baker (2010) discusses the importance of symmetry arguments in metaphysics, 
especially in relation to the “identity of indiscernables”, but again does not propose symmetry as a 
criterion for scientific law. That said, our analysis clearly lies in the vicinity of what others have had in 
mind in their accounts of laws and symmetries. 
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equal to its inverse image under y. Property P is a law if it is nomologically necessary 
for the system and invariant under all symmetries in Y.  
For example, suppose T = {1,2,3,...}, and suppose that, for any non-negative integer r, 
the system has the time symmetry yr defined by yr(t) = t+r for all t in T; for simplicity, 
the system has no other symmetries. So, Y = {yr : r = 0,1,2,....}. Now, suppose all 
histories in W satisfy property P which says: “If the state at time 5 is x, then at time 6 it 
is y.” Despite being nomologically necessary for the present system, this property falls 
short of being a law. The inverse image of [P] under any symmetry yr corresponds to 
the property P' which says: “If the state of the system at time 5+r is x, then at time 6+r 
it is y.” Clearly, unless r = 0, [P'] is not the same as [P], and so P is not invariant under 
the system’s symmetries. We call such a property – nomologically necessary but not 
invariant under symmetries – a brute necessity. 
By contrast, suppose all histories in W have the property P which says: “For any t in T, 
if the state of the system at time t is x, then at time t + 1 it is y.” It is easy to see that this 
property is invariant under all symmetries of the system: the inverse image of [P] under 
any symmetry yr is the same as [P]. Thus, P is a law. 
For another example, consider the kinds of temporally evolving systems that arise in 
classical mechanics. These satisfy the law of conservation of energy, which says that 
the total energy (kinetic plus potential) remains constant over time. This can be 
formulated as a property P of the form: “For any times t and t' in T, the total energy of 
the state at time t' equals the total energy of the state at time t.” Clearly, this property is 
invariant under the time symmetries {yr} introduced above. As already mentioned, 
classical mechanical systems also have certain state symmetries, such as spatial 
translations, rotations, reflections, and the permutation of (equal-mass) particles. The 
total energy of a state is unchanged by such symmetries too, so the property P will also 
be invariant under spatial translations and (equal-mass) particle permutations. Indeed, 
total energy is unchanged by every symmetry of the system, and for this reason, 
property P is a law.23 
As we will now see, laws are testable and generalizable in a way in which properties 
that fall short of being laws are not, even if they are nomologically necessary. Suppose 
we are trying to figure out the status of some property P. Is it nomologically necessary? 
Does it capture a general regularity of our system? Is it a law? The first thing to note is 
that when we investigate a system, we are seldom able to observe all its nomologically 
possible histories. Conducting many “runs” of the same experiment is an attempt to 
observe as many histories as possible, but even the best experimental design rarely 
allows us to observe all possible histories. Furthermore, this strategy works only for 
smaller systems that we can isolate in laboratory conditions. When the system is the 
economy, the global ecosystem, or the universe as a whole, we are stuck in a single 
history. We cannot step outside that history and look at alternative histories. The 
observed history is the only evidence we have. Can we still say anything useful about 
the status of property P? It is at this point that symmetries come into play. 
Let us return to our simply example of a system with T = {1,2,3,...} and time 
symmetries of the form yr, where yr(t)=t+r. Consider again the property P that says “if 
                                               
23 Similarly, one can define the laws of conservation of momentum, of angular momentum, and so on. 
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the state at time 5 is x, then at time 6 it is y”, and suppose, as before, that P is 
nomologically necessary, i.e., every history in Ω satisfies P. If we could observe many 
nomologically possible histories of the system, we would be able to verify the 
satisfaction of P in each case. But, as noted, we may be trapped in a single history, h. 
All we can do is watch this history unfold. We first see h(1), then h(2), then h(3), and 
so on. Importantly, we get to observe h(5) and h(6) only once, so we get only one 
chance to observe whether h satisfies property P. Furthermore, even if h does satisfy P, 
this is only a single data point, which tells us very little about the broader status of P. 
Property P might as well be a contingent feature of the actual history we have observed.  
However, we do get to observe h(7), h(8), h(9), and so on. So, we can consider 
properties such as P': “if the state at time 7 is x, then at time 8 it is y”; and P'': “if the 
state at time 9 is x, then at time 10 it is y”; and so on. Note that P' corresponds to the 
inverse image of [P] under y2; and P'' corresponds to the inverse image of [P] under 
y4; and so forth. In other words, if we are patient, we can observe whether history h 
satisfies the properties corresponding to the inverse images of the original property 
under a lot of elements of the system’s symmetry monoid. Similarly, in a system with 
spatial symmetries (of the sort we introduce in Section 3.5), we can in principle observe 
whether h satisfies the properties corresponding to many of the relevant inverse images 
simply by traveling in space. 
Now, if property P was not itself invariant under symmetries, as in the case of our 
example, we would not learn much from this exercise. We would learn that h satisfies 
P (“if h(5)=x, then h(6)=y”), that it satisfies P' (“if h(7)=x, then h(8)=y”), and that it 
satisfies P'' (“if h(9)=x, then h(10)=y”), and so on. But, strictly speaking, these are 
distinct properties, and on the face of it, they do not have all that much in common. By 
contrast, if P is symmetry-invariant, as in the case of the property which says “for all t, 
if h(t)=x, then h(t+1)=y”, then P, P', P'', … are all the same property, and thus the 
present exercise yields a whole series of experimental tests of the same law.  
Moreover, in this case, the single property P picks up a general pattern, of which we 
can observe many instances even within a single history, h, and which lends itself to 
extrapolation into the future. As h unfolds, we can observe that state x is followed by 
state y not just once but many times. Furthermore, once we have observed this regularity 
a sufficient number of times, we may feel confident in hypothesizing that P is indeed a 
law and then predicting that, in the future, state x will also be followed by state y.  
Contrast this with the case of a property that is not symmetry-invariant, such as “if 
h(5)=x, then h(6)=y”. Here, there is no such general pattern, and we have no basis for 
making any predictions. This is the sense in which laws have a testable and 
generalizable character that non-symmetry-invariant properties lack, even when they 
are nomologically necessary.  
There is another way of making the same points. Let P be some property, and let P', P'', 
P''', and so on, be all of its inverse images under the various time (and other) symmetries 
of the system. Let h be the history that we observe. Suppose that, by exhaustive testing, 
we verify that h satisfies P, P', P'', P''', and so on. (Or perhaps we only verify some 
subcollection of these properties, but then infer the rest of them through some form of 
“empirical induction”, which is ubiquitous in science.) At this point, we have actually 
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verified that h satisfies an entire conjunction of properties, informally P Ù P' Ù P'' Ù 
P''' Ù ...., or more formally, the property P* with extension 
[P*] = ∩  y–1([P]). 
                   yÎY 
Note that, by construction, property P* is invariant under all symmetries in Y. Thus, 
although we get to test the initial property P only once, by testing a bunch of “P-like” 
properties at various points in time (and/or positions in space etc.), we have tested not 
only P, but something much stronger, namely P*. But note that P* is not just any 
arbitrary property: it is symmetry-invariant by construction and thus qualifies as a law 
(provided it is also nomologically necessary). Moreover, by entailing all the various 
instances of P-like properties, i.e., P, P', P'', P''', and so on, the hypothesis that property 
P* is a law allows us to make predictions as to what will happen at different points in 
time (or in space, or after making other admissible changes corresponding to 
symmetries of the system).  
This argument suggests that any property that we think we have corroborated by 
performing a large number of empirical tests at different times (or locations in space, 
or different orientations of the experimental apparatus, or different collections of 
otherwise identical atoms, and so on) is ipso facto a symmetry-invariant law, and not 
merely a brute necessity.24 
One can give a similar account of probabilistic laws. Let {Pr'E}EÍW be any conditional 
probability structure, and let y be a symmetry of the system. We define y({Pr'E}EÍW) 
to be the conditional probability structure {Pr''E}EÍW such that, for any events E and D, 
we have Pr''E (D) = Pr'E' (D'), where E' and D' are, respectively, the inverse images of 
E and D under y. Let P be a probabilistic property. Recall that its extension, [P], is a 
subset of the set P of all possible conditional probability structures on W. We say that 
P is invariant under y if [P] is equal to its inverse image under y. A property P that is 
satisfied by the system’s conditional probability structure {PrE}EÍW is a law of the 
system if it is invariant under all symmetries in Y. 
For example, suppose T={1,2,3,...}, and let the time symmetries yr be as defined before. 
Let Y and Z be two subsets of the state space X, and suppose the system’s conditional 
probability structure satisfies the probabilistic property P which says: “Conditional on 
the state being in Y at time 5, there is a 50% probability that the state will be in Z at 
time 6.” The inverse image of [P] under y2 corresponds to the property P' which says: 
“Conditional on the state being in Y at time 7, there is a 50% probability that the state 
will be in Z at time 8.” Clearly, [P'] is not the same as [P]. Thus, [P] is not invariant 
under y2, and so P is not a probabilistic law of the system. 
                                               
24 One might raise the following concern. If P is nomologically necessary, and h is a possible history, 
then h satisfies not only P, but also all inverse images of P under all symmetries. To put it more simply, if 
P is nomologically necessary, then all its inverse images under all symmetries are also nomologically 
necessary. So, whenever P is nomologically necessary, we should be able to corroborate this fact via 
repeated testing, even if P is merely a brute necessity, rather than a symmetry-invariant law. At first sight, 
this may seem to challenge our claim that laws stand out in their testability. However, what have we 
really corroborated via the present exercise of repeated testing is not property P itself, but the much 
stronger (symmetry-invariant) property P* defined above. And that property P* is not merely 
nomologically necessary, but a law.  
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However, suppose the conditional probability structure satisfies the property P which 
says: “For any time t in T, conditional on the state being in Y at time t, there is a 50% 
probability that the state will be in Z at time t+1.” Then it is easy to see that [P] is 
invariant under yr for all positive integers r. If Y consists only of the time symmetries 
{yr : r = 0,1,2,3,....}, then P is invariant under all elements of Y, and so P is a 
probabilistic law. 
As in the case of modal laws, probabilistic laws capture general and repeatable patterns. 
Consider again the probabilistic property P which says: “Conditional on the state being 
in Y at time 5, there is a 50% probability that the state will be in Z at time 6.” Recall 
that this property is not invariant under our system’s time symmetries. Even if the 
system’s conditional probability structure satisfies this property, the property does not 
capture a general pattern. It concerns only the probabilistic transition from time 5 to 
time 6. If, however, the system has all the time symmetries in Y, then we can expect 
the system to satisfy the properties corresponding to the inverse images of [P] under 
the various time symmetries, for instance: P', which says: “conditional on the state 
being in Y at time 7, there is a 50% probability that the state will be in Z at time 8”; and 
P'', which says: “conditional on the state being in Y at time 9, there is a 50% probability 
that the state will be in Z at time 10”; and so forth. By conjoining those properties, we 
can deduce the more general property P*, which says: “For any t in T, if the state of the 
system is in the set Y at time t, there is a 50% probability that it will be in Z at time 
t + 1.” This property is invariant under all the time symmetries, and it does indeed 
qualify as a law.  
The foregoing considerations show that symmetries are central to the testable and 
generalizable character of laws. Without suitable symmetries, generalizing from local 
observations to global laws or testing hypothesized laws would not be possible, 
especially if we can observe only a single history of a given system. Nor would it be 
possible to make predictions about the future based on regularities observed in the past. 
In a slogan, for scientific inference and prediction to work, the system must have 
sufficient symmetries. In effect, when we engage in scientific reasoning about some 
system, or even about the world at large, we rely on the auxiliary hypothesis that this 
system, or the world, is sufficiently symmetrical. If our system, or the world, were what 
Cartwright (1999) calls “dappled”, then presumably we would not be able to 
presuppose such symmetries, and our ability to make scientific generalizations would 
be compromised.25 
In Appendix A, we extend the present analysis to factor systems, which are obtained by 
abstracting away from certain details of the original system. In Appendix B, we extend 
                                               
25 In a system without symmetries (aside from the identity transformation, which is trivially a symmetry), 
the distinction between laws and brute necessities could not be drawn. Every nomologically necessary 
property would then vacuously qualify as a “law”: it could not fail to be invariant under any symmetries. 
But this is clearly a degenerate case. As just argued, in such a system our ability to perform science 
would be seriously limited. Terminologically, one might distinguish between trivial and non-trivial laws. 
Trivial laws are ones that are vacuously symmetry-invariant (because there are no non-trivial 
symmetries). Our interest is of course in non-trivial laws. 
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it to partial and local symmetries, which are often found in systems with special initial 
conditions and/or boundary conditions.26 
2.7 Ergodicity and its significance  
We have noted that, when we scientifically investigate a system, we rely heavily on 
symmetries. As we may be able to observe just a single history, it is only thanks to 
symmetries that we can learn general features of the system from local observations. 
We have seen, for instance, that if we can observe that “if h(5)=x, then h(6)=y”, and the 
system has the time symmetries of the form yr(t)=t+r, then we can infer the general law 
that says: “for all t, if h(t)=x, then h(t+1)=y”. Similarly, if we can observe that 
“conditional on the state being in Y at time 5, there is a 50% probability that it will be 
in Z at time 6”, then we can infer the general law that says: “For any t in T, if the state 
is in Y at time t, there is a 50% probability that it will be in Z at time t + 1.”  
However, while the first, non-probabilistic example (where we observe that one state 
at time 5 is followed by another at time 6) seems unproblematic, the second, 
probabilistic example is trickier. If we are trapped in a single history, it is unclear how 
we could ever make an observation such as: “Conditional on the state being in Y at time 
5, there is a 50% probability that it will be in Z at time 6.” Making this observation 
would seem to require looking at many repetitions of states 5 and 6. So, even if 
probabilistic properties could be generalized via symmetries once we have observed 
them, it is unclear how we could observe such properties in the first place. 
The solution to this problem lies in the property of ergodicity. This is a property that a 
system may or may not have and that, if present, serves as a prerequisite for inferring 
probabilistic information from single histories. Indeed, it may be considered a 
prerequisite for scientific inference more generally. To explain this notion, let us begin 
with a simple example of how we learn probabilistic information from observing just a 
single history. Consider a system whose state at any time is the outcome of an 
independent coin toss, where T = {1,2,3,...}. So, the state space is X = {Heads, Tails}, 
and each possible history in W is one possible Heads/Tails sequence.  
Suppose the true conditional probability structure on W is induced by the single 
parameter p, the probability of Heads. In this example, the Law of Large Numbers 
guarantees that, with probability 1, the limiting frequency of Heads in a given history 
(as time goes to infinity) will match p. This means that the subset of W consisting of 
“well-behaved” histories has probability 1, where a history is well-behaved if (i) there 
exists a limiting frequency of Heads for it (i.e., the proportion of Heads converges to a 
well-defined limit as time goes to infinity) and (ii) that limiting frequency is p. For this 
                                               
26 Finally, it is worth emphasizing that, in our analysis, laws are always defined relative to a given system. 
When some property qualifies as a law of the system given by W and {PrE}EÍW, this does not imply that 
it will also qualify as a law of a different system, say W' and {Pr'E'}E'ÍW'. Different systems may be 
governed by different laws. Indeed, it is widely held that while our universe has certain laws of nature, 
other universes with distinct laws are logically possible. One might wonder whether our analysis only 
captures a notion of “system laws” rather than “laws of nature”. However, if we take the system given 
by W and {PrE}EÍW to represent the universe as a whole, then our account can be interpreted as an 
account of the laws of nature. Further, as implied by Appendix A, the laws of a larger system, such as 
the universe, will constrain the laws of any subsystem that can be derived from it as a “factor system” 
(via constraining its symmetries). Thus, the laws of the universe will constrain the laws of any smaller 
subsystems in it. In Section 4.4, we show that structurally equivalent systems may share the same laws. 
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reason, we will almost certainly (with probability 1) get arbitrarily close to the true 
conditional probability structure on W just by observing a single history and counting 
the number of Heads and Tails in it.  
Now why does this inference work in the present example? As we will see, the system 
is an example of an ergodic system. Its ergodicity manifests itself in the fact that “almost 
all” histories of the system are “well-behaved”, in the sense that we can read off the 
desired probability parameter p from the limiting frequency of Heads. 
To define ergodicity more precisely, consider again a system with T = {1,2,3,...} which 
has all the time symmetries in the set Y = {yr : r = 0,1,2,3,....} (and perhaps other 
symmetries as well, though we set these aside for now). Heuristically, the symmetries 
in Y can be interpreted as describing the evolution of the system over time.27 Suppose 
each time-step corresponds to a day. Then the history h = (a,b,c,d,e,....) describes a 
situation where today’s state is a, tomorrow’s is b, the next day’s is c, and so on. 
Suppose today is Monday. The transformed history y1(h) = (b,c,d,e,f,....) describes a 
situation where today’s state is b, tomorrow’s is c, the following day’s is d, and so on. 
Thus, y1(h) describes the same “world” as h, but as seen from the perspective of 
Tuesday. Likewise, y2(h) = (c,d,e,f,g,....) describes the same “world” as h, but as seen 
from the perspective of Wednesday, and so on.28  
Given the set Y of symmetries, an event E (a subset of W) is Y-invariant if the inverse 
image of E inside of W under y is E itself, for all y in Y. Formally, y-1(E) ∩ W = E for 
all such y. Thus, for any history h in W, h is an element of E if and only if y(h) is an 
element of E. For example, suppose again that the elements of T represent days, and E 
is the event that some property P holds today. If y1, y2, y3, … are the symmetries that 
shift time by one day, by two days, by three days, and so on, then the Y-invariance of 
E implies that property P holds today if and only if it holds tomorrow, the day after 
tomorrow, and so on. Thus, E is a “persistent” event: an event one cannot escape from 
by moving forward in time. In a coin-tossing system, where Y is still the set of time 
translations, examples of Y-invariant events are “all Heads”, where E contains only the 
history (Heads, Heads, Heads, …), and “all Tails”, where E contains only the history 
(Tails, Tails, Tails, …). 
Recall that symmetries preserve the unconditional probabilities of any event E. The 
system is ergodic (with respect to Y) if, for any Y-invariant event E, the unconditional 
probability of E, i.e., PrW(E), is either 0 or 1.29 In other words, the only persistent events 
                                               
27 Mathematically, the pair (W, Y) can be interpreted as a classical dynamical system, as defined in 
footnote 6, with W playing the role of a state space (from an outside observer’s perspective) and the 
transformations in Y playing the role of state transformation rules. 
28 Note that, under this heuristic interpretation, the world “forgets” its past history: from the perspective 
of Tuesday, it is as if Monday never happened. This is just an artefact of the formal mathematical model 
we are using in this example and has no deeper significance. If we used the set Z of all integers instead 
of the natural numbers to model time, it would obviate this issue. 
29 See, e.g., Peterson (1989, Section 2.4), Walters (2000, Section 1.5, Definition 1.4), or Krengel (1985, 
Section 1.1.3, Definition 1.7) for precise definitions and further discussion. Ergodicity is usually defined 
for a symmetry monoid generated by a single transformation y, in which case the pair (X, y) is called an 
ergodic dynamical system.  But the definition generalizes immediately to arbitrary symmetry monoids. 
See, e.g., Krengel (1985, p. 203). At first sight, this seems unrelated to the use of the term in probability 
theory, where a stochastic process (such as a Markov process or random field) is called ergodic if it has 
a unique stationary measure. But the two definitions are related because any stochastic process can be 
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are those which occur in almost no history (i.e., PrW(E) = 0) and those which occur in 
almost every history (i.e., PrW(E) = 1).30 The ergodicity of our coin-tossing system is 
exemplified by the fact that the Y-invariant events “all Heads” and “all Tails” occur 
with probability 0. 
In an ergodic system, it is possible to estimate the probability of any event “empirically”, 
by counting the frequency with which that event occurs, much like the probability of 
Heads in the coin-tossing example.31 Frequencies are thus evidence for probabilities. 
The formal statement of this is the following important result from the theory of 
dynamical systems and stochastic processes. 
Ergodic Theorem: Suppose the system is ergodic. Let E be any event and 
let h be any history. For all times t in T, let Nt be the number of elements r 
in the set {1, 2, ..., t} such that yr(h) is in E. Then, with probability 1, the 
ratio Nt / t will converge to PrW(E) as t increases towards infinity.32 
Intuitively, Nt is the number of times the event E has “occurred” in history h from time 
1 up to time t. The ratio Nt / t is therefore the frequency of occurrence of event E (up to 
time t) in history h. This frequency might be measured, for example, by performing a 
sequence of experiments or observations at times 1, 2, ..., t. The Ergodic Theorem says 
that, almost certainly (i.e., with probability 1), the empirical frequency will converge 
to the true probability of E, PrW(E), as the number of observations becomes large. The 
estimation of the probability of Heads via the Law of Large Numbers in our coin-
tossing example is a special case of this.  
To understand the significance of the Ergodic Theorem, let Y and Z be two subsets of 
X, and suppose E is the event “h(1) is in Y” and D is the event “h(2) is in Z”. Then the 
intersection E ∩ D is the event “h(1) is in Y, and h(2) is in Z”. The theorem says that, by 
performing a sequence of observations over time, we can estimate PrW(E) and 
PrW(E ∩ D) with arbitrarily high precision. Thus, we can compute the ratio 
PrW(E ∩ D) / PrW(E) (provided PrW(E) ≠ Æ). But this ratio is the conditional probability 
PrE(D). And so we are able to estimate the conditional probability that the state at time 
2 will be in Z, given that at time 1 it is in Y. This illustrates that, by allowing us to estimate 
unconditional probabilities, the Ergodic Theorem also allows us to estimate conditional 
probabilities, and thereby to infer the conditional probability structure {PrE}EÍW. Clearly, 
the system’s symmetries were indispensable for this exercise. Without symmetries, the 
frequentist reasoning to which the Ergodic Theorem appeals would not make sense. 
                                               
represented as a dynamical system (Peterson, 1983, Sections 1.2B to 1.2D). Finally, in statistical physics, 
Boltzmann’s Ergodic Hypothesis conjectures that the fraction of the time that a physical system spends 
in a particular region of its state space is proportional to the size of that region. This was the inspiration 
for the Birkhoff Ergodic Theorem (see below). 
30 If W is infinite, there is a subtle distinction between almost no history (PrW(E) = 0) and no history 
(E = Æ). Likewise, almost every history (PrW(E) = 1) is subtly distinct from every history (E = W). 
31 This insight is the basis for Reichenbach’s (1949) “straight rule”, which is to take observed frequencies 
as the best estimates of “true” probabilities. See, e.g., Eberhardt and Glymour (2009). 
32 This result is often called the Birkhoff (or Pointwise) Ergodic Theorem. For simplicity, we have stated 
it relatively informally. For formal statements, see Krengel (1985, Section 1.2), Petersen (1989, Section 
2.2), Walters (2000, Theorem 1.14), or Berkovitz, Frigg, and Kronz (2006). Further, we have defined 
ergodicity for a discrete set of time symmetries. More generally, the statements in this section hold for 
any set of symmetries that forms an amenable monoid. See Krengel (1985, Section 6.4). 
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2.8 Occam’s Razor 
We have seen that a system must possess a sufficiently rich set of symmetries to permit 
general inferences from local observations. Up to now, we have taken for granted that 
we know, or are justified in hypothesizing, that the system has these symmetries. But 
what justifies this hypothesis? 
This question is crucial for the success of science. Why are we justified in assuming 
that the system’s laws are the same at different times or in different places? Why should 
replicability of other scientists’ experimental results be considered the norm, rather than 
a miraculous exception? Why is it normally safe to assume that the outcomes of 
experiments will be insensitive to irrelevant details such as the height of the laboratory 
bench, or the orientation of the apparatus relative to the planet Jupiter?   
In effect, we are assuming that the phenomena under investigation are invariant under 
certain symmetries – both temporal, as discussed earlier, and spatial, as discussed later, 
including translations, rotations, and so on. But where do we get this assumption from? 
The answer lies in Occam’s Razor. 
Occam’s Razor is generally a principle of parsimony. One of its best-known versions 
says that, when we try to explain some phenomenon, we should not postulate more 
entities than strictly explanatorily necessary.33 While this version of Occam’s Razor 
deals with the question of which entities to postulate, we are here focusing on another 
version, which concerns the question of which regularities to postulate. Roughly, it 
says that, if two hypotheses about the regularities in the world are equally consistent 
with our total evidence, we should prefer the simpler hypothesis.  
Now the key point is that the hypothesis of a symmetry-rich system is simpler than the 
hypothesis of a symmetry-poor system, other things being equal.34 To see why this is 
the case, contrast two cases. If you hypothesize that the universe has a very large set of 
symmetries, you are thereby postulating a very simple universe. By contrast, if you 
hypothesize that the universe has very few symmetries, you are postulating a very 
complex universe. The first universe admits a parsimonious description in light of its 
symmetry-induced regularity, the second does not. This suggests the following 
provisional formulation of Occam’s Razor principle:  
Occam’s Razor: Always assume that a system has the largest possible set 
of symmetries consistent with all facts about the system that we believe to 
be nomologically necessary. 
We must now make this more precise. We begin by explaining what we mean by “facts 
about the system that we believe to be nomologically necessary”. We represent this by 
a collection of those histories among the logically possible ones that we have not ruled 
out as nomologically impossible. We call this collection of histories our total 
                                               
33 The literature contains many proposals on how to formalize Occam’s Razor. See, e.g., Baker (2013) 
and Fitzpatrick (2015). For an efficiency argument for Occam’s Razor, see Kelly (2007). 
34 Mainzer (1996, Section 5.3, p. 580) also relates symmetry to simplicity and notes that scientists 
generally prefer simpler theories. Likewise, van Fraassen (1989, Section 10.2) notes that when 
constructing a scientific model, we generally assume that the model satisfies a given symmetry unless 
we have good reason to believe the contrary. His slogan is: “an asymmetry must always come from an 
asymmetry”, with some caveats. But neither of these authors connects these ideas to Occam’s Razor. 
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nomological evidence about the system. Formally, it is a subset E of H. It could capture 
the “hard” constraints that we take the system to satisfy, such that, to the best of our 
knowledge, any history outside E is not permitted by the laws of the system. Of course, 
we do not strictly know that W is a subset of E. When we empirically study a system, 
we do not normally know what W is. We can at most be certain that E overlaps with W. 
We will suppose, however, that we are ready to make the auxiliary assumption that E 
includes, but may be logically weaker than, W. 
Given this assumption, we are in a position to test the hypothesis that any given 
transformation of H is a symmetry of our system. Let y be such a transformation, and 
for any n, let yn be the transformation obtained by applying y repeatedly, n times in a 
row. For example, if y is a rotation about some axis by angle q, then yn is the rotation 
by the angle nq.35 For any such transformation yn, we write y–n(E) to denote the inverse 
image in H of E under yn. We say that the transformation y is consistent with the 
nomological evidence E if the intersection  
E ∩ y–1(E) ∩ y–2(E) ∩ y–3(E) ∩ ... 
is non-empty. This means that E does not falsify the hypothesis that y is a symmetry 
of the system.  
For example, suppose we are interested in whether electrostatic forces work the same 
way at all times. We can test this hypothesis by means of Coulomb’s famous “torsion 
balance” experiment, which measures the electrostatic attraction or repulsion between 
two charged objects. Suppose we perform the experiment at time t1 and obtain evidence 
E1, and we perform the same experiment again at time t2 and obtain evidence E2. Thus, 
our evidence is summarized by the event E = E1∩E2. Let y be a time symmetry that 
shifts t1 to t2. Then, focusing for simplicity just on the first two terms of the infinite 
intersection above, we have 
E ∩ y–1(E) = E1 ∩ E2 ∩ y–1(E1) ∩ y–1(E2). 
If the experimental results are the same at times t1 and t2, then E1 = y–1(E2), and the 
expression for E ∩ y–1(E) simplifies to E1 ∩ E2 ∩ y–1(E1). Under reasonable assumptions, 
this is non-empty, meaning that the evidence has not falsified time invariance of 
electrostatic forces. But if the experimental results at times t1 and t2 were different, then 
E1 and y–1(E2) would be disjoint, and so the intersection E ∩ y–1(E) would be empty, 
which would mean that the evidence is inconsistent with time invariance. As it happens, 
many thousands of repetitions of Coulomb’s experiment strongly suggest that the 
intersection is non-empty, and so y is a symmetry. 
Now our version of Occam’s Razor says that we should postulate as symmetries of our 
system a maximal monoid of transformations consistent with our evidence. Formally, 
a monoid Y of transformations (where each y in Y is a function from H into itself) is 
consistent with our total nomological evidence E if the intersection 
 ∩  y–1(E) 
yÎY 
                                               
35 In the present terms, rotations must be represented as transformations of the state space X. In Section 
3.5, we represent rotations more explicitly, relying on a formal representation of space.  
 22 
is non-empty. This is the generalization of the infinite intersection that appeared in our 
definition of an individual transformation’s consistency with the evidence. Further, a 
monoid Y that is consistent with E is maximal if no proper superset of Y forms a 
monoid that is also consistent with E. 
Occam’s Razor (formal): Given our total nomological evidence E about a 
temporally evolving system, always assume that the set of symmetries of 
the system is a maximal monoid Y consistent with E.  
What is the significance of this principle? Recall that we earlier defined Y to be the set 
of all symmetries of our temporally evolving system. In practice, we do not know Y. A 
monoid Y that passes the test of Occam’s Razor, however, can be viewed as our best 
guess as to what the true symmetry monoid is. To disambiguate, let Ytrue denote the 
true symmetry monoid, and let Yhyp denote the hypothesized one.  
If Yhyp is the hypothesized symmetry monoid, and E is our total nomological evidence, 
the intersection  
∩  y–1(E) 
             yÎYhyp 
can be viewed as our best guess as to what the set of nomologically possible histories 
is. It consists of all those histories among the logically possible ones that are not ruled 
out by the hypothesized symmetry monoid Yhyp and the nomological evidence E. We 
call this intersection our nomological hypothesis and label it W(Yhyp,E).  
To see that this construction makes sense, note that, under certain conditions, our 
nomological hypothesis W(Yhyp,E) will reflect the truth about nomological possibility.  
Remark: If (i) the hypothesized symmetry monoid Yhyp is a subset of the 
true symmetry monoid Ytrue, and (ii) E is a superset of W, then the true set 
W of nomologically possible histories is a subset of W(Yhyp,E).  
Condition (i) says that we have not postulated any incorrect symmetries, which is 
compatible with having overlooked some correct symmetries. Condition (ii) says that 
we have not mistakenly ruled out any nomologically possible histories, which was our 
auxiliary assumption about our total nomological evidence. If these conditions hold, 
our nomological hypothesis will indeed be consistent with the truth and will, at most, 
be logically weaker than the truth. 
It is worth explaining the significance of the auxiliary assumption that we have not 
mistakenly ruled out any nomologically possible histories (i.e., E Ê W). Consider the 
simple coin-tossing system from Section 2.7, where histories are sequences of Heads 
and Tails, and time shifts are symmetries. Now consider the event E of getting Heads 
at time 1 and Tails at time 2. If we treated E as our total nomological evidence, this 
would exclude time shifts as symmetries: the event of getting Heads at time 1 and Tails 
at time 2 is not invariant under time shifts. The problem is that E, in this case, is not a 
superset of W: it excludes histories that are in fact nomologically possible. The notion 
of “total nomological evidence” that we require is a “cautious” one. The set E should 
exclude only histories that we are confident in deeming nomologically impossible. This 
is a subtle issue, and a full treatment is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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In Appendix C, we extend the present analysis by offering criteria for choosing a 
maximal symmetry monoid Y consistent with the evidence E in case more than one 
such monoid can be constructed. We suggest that criteria of inferential modesty and 
informational parsimony should guide that choice in cases of non-uniqueness. 
2.9 The role of time 
What is the significance of the linear order of the set T of times? Why is time ordered 
in one way, and not in another? Do the laws of a given system “care” about the ordering 
of time? To put it another way: what does it mean to say that today comes between 
yesterday and tomorrow? Intuitively, it means this: the events that happened yesterday 
cannot “directly influence” the events that will happen tomorrow; their influence must 
be “mediated” by the events that happen today. We now make this claim precise using 
a standard notion from probability theory: the Markov property.36  
To explain this property, we first introduce the notion of conditional independence. Let 
{PrE}EÍW be a conditional probability structure, and let D and E be two events (i.e., 
subsets of W). We say that D and E are independent if PrD(E) = PrW(E) and 
PrE(D) = PrW(D).37 Informally, if we interpret probabilities as encoding “information”, 
this means that learning whether or not D has occurred provides no information about 
whether or not E will occur, and vice versa.  
To illustrate, recall the simple coin-tossing system from Section 2.7. Let E and D be 
the events “the outcome at time 1 is Heads” and “the outcome at time 2 is Tails”. Then 
PrW(E) = ½ and PrW(D) = ½, assuming for simplicity that p = 0.5. Here, the outcome at 
time 1 has no effect on the outcome at time 2. So, even if we tossed Heads at time 1, 
this would not change the probability of obtaining Tails at time 2, and so PrE(D) = ½. 
Likewise, the outcome at time 2 tells us nothing about what happened at time 1. If we 
had not observed the outcome at time 1 but obtained the outcome Tails at time 2, we 
would still assign probability ½ to Heads at time 1. So, PrD(E) = ½. Thus, the events E 
and D are independent. 
Now let C, D, and E be three events. We say that C and E are conditionally independent, 
given D, if PrC∩D(E) = PrD(E) and PrE∩D(C) = PrD(C). Again, if we interpret 
probabilities as encoding “information”, this means the following. Suppose you already 
know that D has occurred. Then learning whether or not C has occurred provides no 
further information about whether or not E will occur, and vice versa.  
To illustrate, return again to the coin-tossing example (where T = {1,2,3,....}) with 
p = 0.5, but suppose we use the tosses of the fair coin to determine the position of a 
token on an infinite line. We move the token after each coin toss: if we toss Heads, we 
move the token one space to the right, and if we toss Tails, we move it one space to the 
left. Let us represent the position of the token by an integer (either positive or negative); 
in other words, X = {...,–3,–2,–1,0,1,2,3,...}. Let xt denote the position of the token at 
time t. Then the rule becomes the following: “If you toss Heads at time t, then 
                                               
36 The importance of Markov properties in understanding causality has been emphasized by Pearl (2000) 
and Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (2000). 
37 If PrW(D)>0, the first equation is equivalent to PrW(E ∩ D) = PrW(D) PrW(E). If PrW(E)>0, the second 
equation is equivalent to PrW(E ∩ D) = PrW(D) PrW(E). Thus, if PrW(D) > 0 and PrW(E) > 0, the two 
equations are equivalent. But if PrW(D) = 0 or PrW(E) = 0, the equations must be stated separately. 
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xt+1  = xt + 1; if you toss Tails at time t, then xt+1 = xt –1.” For simplicity, suppose the 
coin always starts at position 0 (i.e., x1 = 0).38  
If D is an event describing the position of the token at time t, and E is an event 
describing its position at time t+1, then these two events are not independent. For 
example, suppose E is the event “x6 = 3”. Then a simple calculation shows that 
PrW(E) = 5/16. If D is the event “x5 = 2”, then PrD(E) = ½, because the token now has 
a 50% probability of moving from position 2 to position 3 in one time step. Thus, 
PrD(E) ¹ PrW(E). The location of the token at time 5 tells us a great deal about its 
probable location at time 6. 
However, once we know the position at time 5, learning the position at time 4 tells us 
nothing further about the position at time 6. Continuing the previous example, let C be 
the event “x4 = 1”. Then straightforward calculations show that PrC∩D(E) = ½ = PrD(E) 
and PrE∩D(C) = ½ = PrD(C). In other words, if we already knew that the token’s 
position was 2 at time 5 (so that it had a 50% probability of moving to position 3 at 
time 6), then learning its position at time 4 tells us nothing further about where it might 
be at time 6. Likewise, if we already knew that the token’s position was 2 at time 5 (so 
that it has a 50% probability of having been at position 1 at time 4), then learning its 
position at time 6 tells us nothing further about where it might have been at time 4.  
In this example, the conditional independence of the events C and E, given D, is due to 
the fact that D concerns the state of the system at a point in time between the times 
described by C and E and that D provides us with complete information about the state 
of the system at this intermediate time. If D provided only partial information about 
that state, we would not get the same result. For example, suppose D' is the event, “x5 
= 0, 2, or 4”, which does not fully specify the state at time 5. Then it can be shown that 
PrC∩D' (E) > PrD' (E). Here, learning additional information about the state at time 4 can 
still tell us something about where the coin is likely to be at time 6. 
Now let us generalize this example. Let T be any linearly ordered set, let X be any set 
of states, and consider a temporally evolving system given by a collection W of possible 
histories (i.e., functions from T into X) and a conditional probability structure {PrE}EÍW. 
For any time t in T, and any state x in X, let Ext denote the event “the state of the system 
at time t is x”. More generally, for any subset Y of X, let EYt denote the event “the state 
of the system at time t is an element of Y”. We say that the system satisfies the Markov 
property if, for any times r < s < t in T, any subsets Y and Z of X, and any state x in X, 
the events EYr and EZt are conditionally independent, given the event Exs. In other words, 
if you have complete information about the state of the system at some time s (you 
know that the state is x), then learning something about its state at some earlier time 
(e.g., that it was an element of Y at time r) tells you nothing further about its probable 
state at some later time (e.g., about how probable it is that it will fall into the set Z at 
time t). Roughly speaking, this means that the state of the system at time r cannot 
“directly influence” the state of the system at time t. It can only influence that state 
“indirectly”, via influencing the state at the intermediate time s. Any system with this 
property is called Markovian. 
                                               
38 Technically, the system just described is a simple random walk. 
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Note that the Markov property does not say that the system’s future evolution is 
unconditionally independent of its past. It just says that the dependency of the future on 
the past is mediated through the present. This property is fundamental to the way we 
normally think about time. To see this, imagine a universe where the Markov property 
was not true. Then there would exist some times r < s < t in T, some subsets Y and Z 
of X, and some state x in X, such that the conditional probability Pr(EZt | EYr∩Exs) is 
distinct from Pr(EZt | Exs).39 In other words, even with a complete specification of the 
present state x, the probability of some future event Z would depend on whether or not 
some past event Y had occurred. This would suggest that the state specification x does 
not, in fact, contain all the information about the system’s present state; somehow, 
information about the past is bypassing the present and “leaking” directly into the future. 
This, in turn, suggests that this so-called “past” is not really in the past at all; our model 
of the system’s time structure is incorrect. 
We take the Markov property to be a necessary condition for the “correct” ordering of 
time. To be “well-behaved”, a temporally evolving system must be Markovian. What 
the present must do at any point in time in order to count as the present is “separate” 
the past from the future. If this property is violated, the set T does not properly play the 
role of time.  
Three points are worth noting. First, some systems may admit multiple time orderings 
with respect to which they are Markovian. An extreme limiting case is given by our 
original coin-tossing system without the moving token, which is Markovian with 
respect to every ordering of T. Here, the precise order of time is irrelevant. By contrast, 
in the modified coin-tossing system with the token, the order of time matters, as we 
have seen. In fact, the temporal order with respect to which the system satisfies the 
Markov property is essentially unique; it is unique up to time reversals. This brings us 
to our second point. Although the Markov property says something about the linear 
“topology” of time, it tells us nothing about the direction of time. As illustrated by the 
modified coin-tossing system, the Markov property is completely invariant under time 
reversals. In other words, the Markov property only says that the present separates the 
past from the future. But it does not tell us on which side of the present lies the past, 
and on which side lies the future. And third, just as the Markov property says nothing 
about the direction of time, so it says nothing about its duration. There is no purely 
Markovian way of measuring the “length” of a time interval or saying when one time 
interval is longer than another. 
What, then, can we say about the directionality and length of time? It turns out that 
symmetries are crucial for the analysis of both. In the case of length, we offer a detailed 
analysis in Section 3.9, showing that there is a natural way of measuring time duration, 
as long as the system has sufficiently rich symmetries. And in the case of directionality, 
we can say that a condition for time to have a direction is that time reversals are not 
symmetries of the system. Since time reversals are symmetries of classical mechanical 
systems (in the sense explained in footnote 19), it follows that, in those systems, there 
is no real direction of time: temporal orders are unique at most up to time reversal. By 
contrast, in thermodynamic systems, time reversals are not symmetries, and hence these 
systems meet the condition for time to have a direction. To the extent that the world, as 
                                               
39 Here, to avoid cumbersome subscripts, we are using the notation Pr(A | B) to denote the conditional 
probability PrB(A). 
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seen from our perspective, is best understood as a system in which time reversals are 
not symmetries, there is then a coherent basis for the directionality of time (for further 
discussion, see Roberts 2013).  
3. Spatially extended systems 
3.1 Basic definitions 
We now turn to a more richly described class of systems whose states evolve over time. 
To define a system in this class, we still represent time by a linearly ordered set T, but 
also incorporate an explicit notion of space, represented by a set S of spatial locations. 
Let S ´ T be the set of all ordered pairs of the form (s, t), where s is an element of S, 
and t is an element of T. We refer to S ´ T as space-time. Again, let X denote a set of 
possible states, called the state space. Unlike before, the elements of X are no longer 
“global” states, in which the system can be at specific points in time, but “local” states, 
in which the system can be at specific points in space and time. Again, we treat the 
elements of X as primitives of our model. Histories are now functions from space-time 
(rather than merely time) into the state space. Formally, a spatially extended history is 
a function h from S ´ T into X. For each point (s, t) in S ´ T, h(s, t) is the state of the 
system in spatial location s at time t. 
In analogy to our earlier model, we write W to denote the set of all spatially extended 
histories deemed possible, which, as before, play the role of possible worlds. Again, 
this is a subset – often a proper one – of the set H of all logically possible histories (here, 
all functions from S ´ T into X). So, membership in W is best interpreted as nomological 
possibility. Subsets of W are called events. 
Finally, we define a conditional probability structure on W. As before, this is a family 
of conditional probability functions {PrE}EÍW, containing one PrE for each event E in 
W, with standard properties. Recall that PrE assigns to any event in W the conditional 
probability of that event, given E. A spatially extended system is the pair consisting of 
the set W of possible spatially extended histories and the conditional probability 
structure {PrE}EÍW.  
For example, in a classical mechanical system, T is the set R of real numbers, S is the 
three-dimensional Euclidean space (i.e., S = R3), and each state h(s,t) in X is given by 
the set of particles present at spatial location s at time t, along with their physically 
relevant properties (e.g., masses and momenta) and the values of any force fields (e.g., 
gravity) acting on these particles.40 In a classical electrodynamical system, the state 
h(s, t) must also specify the particles’ charges, along with the electric and magnetic 
field vectors at (s, t). In that sense, electrodynamics relies on a richer ontology than 
classical mechanics.   
In a quantum-mechanical system, it might be tempting to suppose that S = R3, and to 
suppose that h(s, t) is given by the values of the wave functions of each of the particles 
in the system at space-time location (s, t). But this is not correct, because the wave 
functions of interacting particles in a quantum system cannot generally be defined 
independently of each other. Instead, we must define a joint wave function for the entire 
                                               
40 We are not saying that this is the most parsimonious or computationally convenient way to represent 
a classical mechanical system. It is only one way of representing such a system in our framework. 
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multi-particle system. So, in a quantum-mechanical system with n particles, we would 
define space to be S = (R3)n, with three coordinates representing the spatial “position” 
of each of the n particles in an underlying ordinary Euclidean space;41 and we would 
define the set X of possible states of the system to be the set of complex numbers, 
capturing amplitudes, whose squared absolute values behave formally like probabilities. 
Thus a spatially extended history h is a function from (R3)n ´ T into the set of complex 
numbers, representing the joint wave function of the whole ensemble of particles. 
For instance, if there are two particles, labelled 1 and 2, then h(x1, y1, z1, x2, y2, z2, t) 
represents the joint state at time t of particles 1 and 2 at positions x1, y1, z1 and x2, y2, z2 
in the underlying three-dimensional Euclidean space. This joint state of the two 
particles is a complex number whose squared absolute value can be interpreted, under 
some assumptions, as the probability of particles 1 and 2 being observable at positions 
x1, y1, z1 and x2, y2, z2, respectively, at time t. 
3.2 Determinism and indeterminism 
As in the case of temporally evolving systems, we can define a family of notions of 
determinism and indeterminism for spatially extended systems. For any subset L of 
locations in S ´ T, we write hL to denote the restriction of the function h to the points in 
L. We can then ask for which proper subsets L of S ´  T, if any, hL has a unique extension 
to all of S ´ T in W. Again, an extension of hL is a history h' such that h'L = hL. When hL 
is uniquely extendible to all of S ´ T, we say that history h is L-deterministic. 
For example, the histories of classical mechanical systems are L-deterministic for any 
subset L of S ´ T that has the form S ´ T', where T' is any non-empty subset of T. 
Information about the system for even a single “time slice” of space-time, i.e., a set of 
the form S´{t} for some t in T, suffices to determine the full spatially extended history. 
In contrast, the histories of quantum-mechanical systems (if wave-function collapses 
are allowed) are not generally L-deterministic when L consists of time slices. 
The present definitions allow us to explore some interesting possibilities not captured 
by standard definitions that focus exclusively on past-to-future determination.42 For 
example, some systems might encode their entire spatially extended history in each 
individual space-time location. Histories would then be L-deterministic for every 
singleton set L={(s,t)}, where (s,t) is in S ´ T. Here, we would have an extreme form of 
local-to-global determinism. Alternatively, some systems might encode their entire 
spatially extended history in some collection of “spatial slices of time”, i.e., some subset 
L of S ´ T which has the form S' ´ T, where S' is a non-empty subset of S, possibly 
singleton. This would be a kind of spatial, not temporal, determinism.43 Other systems 
might never be L-deterministic for any proper subset L of S ´ T.  
                                               
41 Strictly speaking, particles in quantum systems do not have “positions”, so we are using this term 
rather loosely. Also, there is a dual representation of the wave function (obtained via Fourier transform), 
where the coordinates in (R3)n represent the “momenta” (again, loosely) of the n particles. These two 
representations are equally valid. 
42 For an earlier discussion of local-to-global forms of determinism, see Earman (1986, pp. 33–35). 
43 This sort of determinism occurs in expansive cellular automata, a class of spatially extended systems 
discussed in the theory of dynamical systems. See Pivato (2009). 
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There may also be some more limited, non-global forms of determination, for instance 
when a history restricted to some set L of locations is uniquely extendible to a history 
restricted to some superset L* of L, which is still smaller than S ´ T in its entirety.44 To 
capture this idea, we can say that a history h is L-to-L*-deterministic if, for any history 
h' in W, if hL = h'L, then hL* = h'L*.  
We might imagine, for instance, systems that are deterministic “across space” but not 
“across time”. In such a system, a history restricted to some set L of the form S' ´ {t}, 
where S' is a non-empty subset of S and t a point in time, might determine the entire 
“time slice” of that history across L* = S ´ {t}, but not the rest of the history. Some 
crystals and other chemical or physical systems involving highly regular spatial 
structures might have this feature. Similarly, for suitable specifications of L and L*, we 
can represent the phenomenon that, in some systems in which “information” travels 
with finite speed, events at particular space-time locations at time t1 are entirely 
determined by the events occurring within their “backwards light cones” at some time 
t0 < t1. Such systems may be L-to-L*-deterministic, but not deterministic in a more 
global sense. 
3.3 Nomological possibility and necessity 
In analogy to the case of temporally evolving systems, we can define two modal 
operators for each set L of space-time locations, namely nomological possibility and 
necessity relative to L. For each set L Í S ´ T, call one history, h', accessible from 
another, h, relative to L, if the restrictions of h and h' to L coincide, i.e., h'L = hL. We 
then write hRLh'. For any event E Í W, we define  
uL E = {h Î W : for some h' Î W with hRLh', we have h' Î E}, 
nL E = {h Î W : for all h' Î W with hRLh', we have h' Î E}. 
Here, uL E and nL E are, respectively, the sets of all histories in which E is 
nomologically possible and nomologically necessary once the history in space-time 
region L is given. Important special cases are (i) L = S ´ T', where S is all of space and 
T' is a particular set of time points, such as those up to time t, (ii) L = S' ´ T, where T is 
all of time and S' is some spatial region, and (iii) L = Æ for possibility and necessity in 
the “atemporal” sense. Since the present definitions are completely analogous to their 
earlier counterparts in Section 2.3, we will not say more about them here. 
3.4 Modal and probabilistic properties 
We now turn again to the question of how to distinguish between those properties of a 
system that qualify as “laws” and those that fall short of being laws. As before, our 
analysis is based on the notion of symmetry, but now with the additional ingredient that 
these symmetries can involve space as well as time. 
In analogy to our earlier definition, a property of histories, P, is a binary feature that a 
spatially extended history may or may not have. Its extension is some subset [P] of the 
set H of all logically possible histories. A spatially extended history h satisfies P if h 
                                               
44  For example, this phenomenon arises frequently in the solution of boundary value problems in 
mathematical physics. See Pivato (2010). 
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belongs to [P]. Again, if [P] includes all of W, then P can be called nomologically 
necessary. Similarly, a probabilistic property, P, is a binary feature that a conditional 
probability structure may or may not have, and its extension, [P], is the set of all those 
conditional probability structures on W that satisfy P. 
3.5 Symmetries 
The notion of a state symmetry for spatially extended systems is virtually identical to 
the one defined in Section 2.5 for temporally evolving systems, so we do not discuss it 
further.45 Instead, we turn directly to symmetries acting on space-time. Let y be a 
function from S ´ T into itself (i.e., a transformation of space-time). Again, y induces 
a function from the set H of logically possible histories into itself. For any spatially 
extended history h, we define the transformed history  
y(h) = h', where, for all (s,t) in S ´ T, h'(s,t) = h(y(s,t)). 
As before, given any set E of histories in H, the inverse image of E under y, written 
y–1(E), is the set of all histories h in H such that y(h) lies in E. The function y is a 
symmetry if 
• y(W) = W; and 
• for any events E and D in W, if E' and D' are the inverse images of E and D 
under y, then PrE' (D') = PrE(D).46 
For example, if T is the set of real numbers (i.e., T = R) and S is the three-dimensional 
Euclidean space (i.e., S = R3), we can consider a spatially extended system in classical 
mechanics. The following transformations of S ´ T are space-time symmetries of such 
a system, each defined for all (s,t) in S ´ T:  
• Time translation: y(s,t) = (s, t+r), where r is a fixed real number; 
• Spatial translation: y(s,t) = (s+v, t), where v is a fixed three-dimensional vector 
(an element of R3); and 
• Space-time rescaling: y(s,t) = (r s, r t), where r > 0 is a fixed real number.  
More general symmetries include composite functions resulting from the combination 
of a transformation f of the state space (X) with a transformation y of space-time 
(S´T). 47  Examples in classical mechanics are spatial rotations, spatial reflections, 
spatial rescalings, and Galilean transformations.48 Crucially, it is possible that neither 
                                               
45 For an example, take an n-particle quantum system, where S = (R3)n, X is the set of complex numbers, 
and a spatially extended history h is a wave function. Let f be a phase rotation map on the complex 
plane; formally, there is some angle q such that, for all x in X, f(x) = eiqx. Then f is a state symmetry. 
46 As before, for any subsets D, E of H, we define PrE(D) = PrE∩W(D∩W), provided E ∩ W ≠ Æ. 
47 An additional property we might require of a space-time transformation y is time preservation: for 
any points (s1,t1) and (s2,t2) in S ´ T, with y(s1,t1) = (s'1,t'1) and y(s2,t2) = (s'2,t'2), if t1 ≤ t2, then t'1 ≤ t'2. 
This implies that if t1 = t2, then t'1 = t'2. A time-preserving transformation acts on S´T such that the set 
of all space-time points at time t1 gets moved en bloc to the set of all space-time points at time t'1. The 
transformations described above have this property, but we do not need to include it in our definition. 
48 These are defined as follows. Spatial rotation: Fix a line L in S and an angle q. For any point s in S, let 
s' be the point obtained by rotating s by an angle of –q around L. For all (s,t) in S ´ T, define y(s,t) = (s',t). 
Let L' be the line parallel to L, but passing through the origin. For all x in X, define f(x) by rotating all 
the momentum vectors and force field vectors in x by the angle q around L'. Spatial reflection: Fix a 
plane P in S. For any point s in S, let s' be the point obtained by reflecting s across P. For all (s,t) in S ´ T, 
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the transformation f of the state space nor the transformation y of space-time alone is 
a symmetry, and yet, when combined, they form a symmetry.49  
Of course, any combination of symmetries is also a symmetry. An example is a 
spatiotemporal translation, which is a combination of a time translation and a spatial 
translation. In a classical electrodynamical system, only the spatiotemporal translations 
and rotations are space-time symmetries. Galilean transformations are not space-time 
symmetries of classical electrodynamics; indeed, this was the original impetus for the 
development of special relativity theory. 
3.6 Laws and their significance 
As in the earlier case of temporally evolving system, a modal law of a spatially extended 
system is a property of histories, P, that is nomologically necessary for the system and 
invariant under all of the system’s symmetries. A probabilistic law is a probabilistic 
property, P, that is satisfied by the system’s conditional probability structure and 
invariant under all of its symmetries. 
For example, let S = R3 and T = R, and suppose the symmetry monoid Y contains all 
the spatiotemporal translations defined in the previous section. Suppose all histories of 
the system satisfy the property P which says: “If the state at space-time position 
(3,7,2,14) is x, then at position (4,8,1,17) it is y.” If y is a spatial translation by the 
vector (1,2,3), then the inverse image of [P] under y corresponds to the property P' 
which says: “If the state at (4,9,5,14) is x, then at position (5,10,4,17) it is y.” Clearly, 
[P'] is not the same as [P], and so property P falls short of being a law. 
However, suppose all histories satisfy the property P which says: “For any location (s1, 
s2, s3) in S and any time t in T, if the state at space-time position (s1, s2, s3, t) is x, then 
at position (s1+1, s2+1, s3–1, t+3) it is y.” It is easy to see that [P] is invariant under all 
spatiotemporal translations. If Y consists only of the spatiotemporal translations, then 
P is invariant under all symmetries, and so P is a law. 
An illustration is Gauss’s Law in an electrodynamical system. This asserts, roughly, 
that the net “flux” of the electric field passing through the walls of any closed 
compartment is proportional to the net charge contained inside that compartment. This 
property is invariant under spatiotemporal translations, because the net flux and the net 
charge are unchanged by such transformations. Indeed, Gauss’s Law is preserved by 
every symmetry of an electrodynamical system; that is why it is a law. 
                                               
define y(s,t) = (s', t). Let P' be the plane parallel to P, but passing through the origin. For all x in X, 
define f(x) by reflecting all the momentum vectors and force field vectors in x across P'. Spatial rescaling: 
Fix some real number r > 0, and define y(s,t) = (s/r, t) for all (s,t) in S ´ T. Meanwhile, let f be a 
transformation of X that multiplies the momentum vector of every particle by r, and also multiplies all 
force field vectors by r. Galilean transformation: For all (s,t) in S ´ T, define ψ(s,t) = (s – tv, t), where v 
is a fixed three-dimensional vector (an element of R3). Meanwhile, for all x in X, define f(x) by adding 
the vector v to all momentum vectors in x. 
49 In all four examples in footnote 48, neither y nor f is itself a symmetry. But when combined, they do 
form a symmetry. For another example, in classical electrodynamics, let y be a spatial reflection acting 
on S ´ T, and let f be a transformation of X which applies the corresponding reflection to all momentum 
vectors and field vectors, and which further negates the magnetic field vector. Neither one of these 
transformations is a symmetry by itself, but when combined, they do form a symmetry. 
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As before, the significance of laws, as opposed to properties that fall short of being 
laws, lies in their openness to testing and generalization. Consider again the property: 
“If the state at space-time position (3,7,2,14) is x, then at position (4,8,1,17) it is y.” 
This property is observable exactly once in any history, namely at space-time position 
(3,7,2,14) alone. Taken in isolation, the observation that some history has this property 
tells us very little. It leaves open whether there is some broader regularity. By contrast, 
consider the property: “For any location (s1, s2, s3) in S and any time t in T, if the state 
at position (s1, s2, s3, t) is x, then at position (s1+1, s2+1, s3–1, t+3) it is y.” Recall that, 
if the system’s symmetry monoid consists of all spatiotemporal translations, then this 
property is a law. Indeed, it has many observable manifestations in each history, both 
at different times and in different places, and it thus picks up a pattern that we can in 
principle test and use as a basis for predictions, even within a single history. 
3.7 Spatiotemporal ergodicity and its significance 
Before turning to a more detailed analysis of the role of space in a spatially extended 
system, it is worth sketching how the property of ergodicity can be extended to such a 
system and discussing the significance of this. In the present case, too, ergodicity is the 
key to learning a system’s conditional probability structure, even if we are able to 
observe only a single history of the system. 
Recall that, for some set Y of symmetries, an event E (a subset of W) is Y-invariant if, 
for every y in Y, the inverse image of E inside of W under y is E itself. For illustrative 
purposes, suppose Y consists of all spatiotemporal translations by four-dimensional 
vectors of integers (applying the definition from Section 3.5). 50  The system is 
spatiotemporally ergodic if the unconditional probability of any Y-invariant event E, 
PrW(E), is either 0 or 1.  
Since Y consists of spatiotemporal translations, Y-invariant events are events from 
which one cannot escape by travelling through space, or by travelling forwards or 
backwards through time. In our example, let y be a spatiotemporal translation in Y 
such that, for all (s1, s2, s3, t) in S ´ T, we have y(s1, s2, s3, t) = (s1+5, s2–7, s3+10, t+3). 
If we interpret the spatially extended history h as describing a possible world “from the 
perspective of position (0,0,0,0)”, then, heuristically, the transformed history y(h) 
describes the same world “from the perspective of position (5,–7,10,3)”. Here a Y-
invariant event E has the property that whenever a history h is in E, then so is y(h). 
Roughly speaking, this means that the world described by h appears to be in the set E 
“from the perspective of position (0,0,0,0)” if and only if it appears to be in E “from 
the perspective of position (5,–7,10,3)”, and so on. Ergodicity requires any such event 
to occur either almost always (with probability 1) or almost never (with probability 0). 
In a spatiotemporally ergodic system, we can estimate the probability of any event by 
counting the spatiotemporal frequency with which that event occurs.  
Spatiotemporal Ergodic Theorem: Suppose the system is 
spatiotemporally ergodic. Let E be any event and let h be any history. For 
all r > 0, let Yr be the set of all spatiotemporal translations by any vector 
(v1, v2, v3, v4) with integer coordinates between 1 and r. Let Nr be the 
                                               
50 The system might also have other spatiotemporal symmetries, but this is irrelevant here. 
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number of translations y in Yr such that y(h) is in E. Then, with probability 
1, the ratio Nr / r4 will converge to PrW(E) as r increases towards infinity.51 
Intuitively, Nr is the number of times the event E has “occurred” in the spatially 
extended history h from time 1 to time r and inside a three-dimensional box with side-
length r. The ratio Nr / r4 is therefore the frequency of occurrence of event E, up to time 
r inside this box, in the spatially extended history h. This frequency might be measured, 
for example, by performing a sequence of experiments or observations inside this box. 
The Spatiotemporal Ergodic Theorem says that, with probability 1, the empirical 
frequency will converge to the true probability of E as the number of observations 
becomes large.52 As explained in Section 2.7, we can use this procedure to estimate not 
only unconditional probabilities but also conditional ones, and thereby to learn the 
properties of the conditional probability structure {PrE}EÍW.   
A broader lesson is that whether a system is ergodic in the first place depends on the 
system’s symmetries. If a system is rich in symmetries, then ergodicity becomes easier 
to achieve than if the system has only few symmetries. To see this, note that the notion 
of Y-invariance is logically more demanding for a larger set Y of symmetries than for 
a smaller one, since an event E will need to be preserved under more symmetries in 
order to qualify as Y-invariant. As a result, there will be fewer Y-invariant events if Y 
is large, and hence the property of ergodicity, which constrains the probability of Y-
invariant events, becomes less demanding. Conversely, if the set Y of symmetries is 
small, more events may qualify as Y-invariant. In the limit, if Y contains only the 
(trivial) identity symmetry, then every event E will be Y-invariant, and so no system 
with a non-degenerate conditional probability structure will qualify as ergodic. (Recall 
that, in an ergodic system, the unconditional probability of every Y-invariant event 
must be either 0 or 1. If all events are Y-invariant, this rules out non-degenerate 
probabilities.) Thus, we must conclude not only that ergodicity is a key prerequisite for 
inferring a system’s conditional probability structure from local observations, but also 
that without enough symmetries this inference would not get off the ground.53 
3.8 The role of space 
What is the role of “space” in a spatially extended system? As we will now see, the 
structure of space affects the way the system evolves over time. To make this precise, 
                                               
51 For simplicity, we here assume that the symmetry monoid Y is isomorphic to Z4, where Z is the monoid 
of integers. The theorem, which we have stated somewhat informally, also holds if Y is isomorphic to 
R4, or if Y is any amenable monoid. For a more formal statement, see Krengel (1985, Chapter 6). 
52 It is not necessary to average over a sequence of “boxes”; the same argument works for any sequence 
of sets which increase in size and thickness in an appropriate sense, technically any Følner sequence.   
53 One complication is that not all systems are ergodic. For example, in systems with conservation laws, 
such as conservation of energy or momentum, each value of the conserved variables determines a non-
trivial invariant subset of W. But the “Ergodic Decomposition Theorem” shows that any non-ergodic 
system can be split up into “ergodic components” – informally, minimal invariant subsets of W, each of 
which (except possibly a set of measure zero) supports its own ergodic probability function (see, e.g., 
Glasner 2003, p. 72, Theorem 3.22). If we are part of the system, then we are already confined to one 
such component. Furthermore, even if the system as a whole is not ergodic, many of its factor systems 
may be ergodic (see Appendix A). This suggests that, by choosing the right level of description for the 
system (e.g., by adopting a sufficiently coarse-grained, higher-level description, as discussed in List and 
Pivato 2015), we may be able to reap the benefits of ergodicity. For the applicability of ergodic methods 
to non-ergodic Hamiltonian systems, see Berkovitz, Frigg, and Kronz (2006, Section 4). 
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we first introduce a formal representation of the topology of space and then discuss its 
role in the system’s dynamics. 
The topology of space can be represented by a binary relation ® between subsets of S. 
Heuristically, if R and R' are two subsets of S, such as two “regions” of space, then 
R ® R' means that R and R' are “adjacent” in that information from R can flow “directly” 
into R', without needing to pass through some intervening points “between” R and R'. 
Later, we explain exactly what we mean by “information flow”, but for our initial 
discussion, we leave it unexamined. We call ® the adjacency structure of space.54  
Adjacency structures arise naturally in many systems. For example, suppose S is 
ordinary three-dimensional Euclidean space, and suppose information can flow only 
“continuously” through this space. This would be the case, for instance, in a system 
consisting of particles travelling along continuous trajectories and interacting via 
continuous force fields, such as those found in classical mechanics, or in a system 
described by partial differential equations, such as those found in quantum mechanics, 
classical electrodynamics, or hydrodynamics. In such systems, for any subsets R and R' 
of S, we have R ® R' if there exists a point s in R such that, for any radius r > 0, the 
ball of radius r centred at s intersects R'.55 
For another example, suppose S is the three-dimensional integer lattice: the set of all 
ordered triples s = (s1, s2, s3), where s1, s2, and s3 are integers. Say that two points s and 
s' in S are neighbours if they differ in only one coordinate and that difference is 1. Thus 
(3,7,5) and (3,6,5) are neighbours. Suppose information can flow only directly between 
neighbours in the lattice. Then, for any subsets R and R' of S, we have R ® R' if some 
point in R is a neighbour of some point in R'.56 Discrete spatial geometries of this kind 
can be found in a class of systems called cellular automata.57   
For a final example, consider a directed graph, which consists of a set of “vertices”, 
along with a set of “arrows” which connect pairs of vertices. Directed graphs can be 
used to model electric circuits, communication networks (e.g., the internet), economic 
and transportation networks, and biological systems (e.g., neural networks, gene 
regulatory networks, and epidemiological networks). Suppose S is the set of vertices. 
Then, for any subsets R and R' in S, we have R®R' if there is an arrow from some 
vertex in R to some vertex in R'.   
If the sets R and R' overlap (i.e., R ∩ R' ¹ Æ), then clearly we have both R ® R' and 
R' ® R. However, the examples above show that we can have R ® R' even if R and R' 
do not overlap, as long as the two sets “touch” each other in some sense. Intuitively, 
R ® R' means that it is not possible to interpose any “barrier” between R and R'; there 
is no “gap” between them.  
What role does the adjacency structure play in a spatially extended system? Why does 
space have one adjacency structure rather than another? Just as we argued earlier in the 
                                               
54 Adjacency structures are similar to proximity relations, which have been studied extensively in general 
topology (e.g., Willard 1970, Sections 40 and 41). But we do not assume that our adjacency structures 
satisfy the axioms of a proximity relation, so they are more versatile. 
55 Generally, an adjacency structure can be defined in a similar way on any metric or topological space. 
56 Generally, an adjacency structure can be defined in a similar way on any Cayley graph of any group. 
57 See Ilachinski (2001) and Moore and Mertens (2011). 
 34 
case of time, we will now argue that a “correct” adjacency structure on space is one that 
satisfies a Markov property with respect to the conditional probability structure 
{PrE}EÍW. This Markov property is defined by considering conditional probabilities 
based on “partial information” about a spatially extended history.  
We therefore need a precise way to talk about such “partial information”. Let R be a 
subset of S, and let R ´ T be the set of all ordered pairs (s,t), where s is an element of R, 
and t is an element of T. So, R ´ T is the set of all time-slices restricted to the spatial 
region R. For any history h in W, recall that hR´T denotes the restriction of h to the set 
R ´ T. This restriction records only the part of the history h which “happens inside R”. 
Let us then define the event [hR´T] to be the set of all extensions of hR´T to full histories 
in W, i.e., the set of all h' in W such that hR´T = h'R´T. These are precisely the histories 
that are accessible from h relative to the space-time region R ´ T. The Markov property 
for adjacency structures will be based on conditional independence with respect to such 
events, in the following way. 
For any event E (i.e., a subset of W), we say that E happens inside R if, for all histories 
h and h' such that hR´T = h'R´T, history h is an element of E if and only if history h' is an 
element of E. In other words, the question of whether or not a particular history is an 
element of E is completely determined by the restriction of that history to spatial 
“region” R.  
A tripartition of S is a triple (R, R', R''), where R, R', and R'' are three disjoint subsets 
of S which together cover S (i.e., R È R' È R'' = S), such that it is not the case that R®R'' 
or R''®R. Heuristically, this means that the set R' “separates” R from R''. For example, 
suppose S is three-dimensional Euclidean space, with the adjacency structure described 
above. Let R be the set of all points whose distance to the origin is less than 1: the unit 
ball. Let R' be the set of all points whose distance to the origin is between 1 and 2, so 
R' is a sort of thick spherical “shell” around R. Finally, let R'' be the set of all points 
whose distance to the origin is greater than 2. Then (R, R', R'') is a tripartition of S.  
We say that the adjacency structure ® satisfies the Markov property with respect to the 
conditional probability structure {PrE}EÍW if, for any tripartition (R, R', R'') and any 
history h in W, any event which happens inside R is conditionally independent from any 
event which happens inside R'', given everything that happens in R' (i.e., given [hR'´T]). 
Heuristically, this means that there is no way for information to propagate from R into 
R'', or vice versa, without first passing through R'. For example, suppose S is three-
dimensional Euclidean space, and (R, R', R'') is the “concentric sphere” tripartition 
described above. In this case, the spherical shell R' acts as a barrier that isolates the 
ball-shaped compartment R from any influences coming from the “outer region” R''. If 
we have complete information about the history inside R' (i.e., we know [hR' ´ T]), then 
we have complete control over the boundary conditions for any experiment we conduct 
inside R, and thus we do not need to control or even know what happens in the outer 
region R''. 
Scientists implicitly assume that space satisfies the Markov property every time they 
construct a laboratory apparatus that “isolates” some experiment from the surrounding 
environment. Indeed, people also implicitly assume the Markov property every time 
they close the doors and windows of their houses to keep out the cold. Thus, the Markov 
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property is central to the way we ordinarily think of space. It underpins the adjacency 
structure of space in the same way it underpins the order structure of time.  
Just as with time, however, the Markov property does not completely determine the 
structure of space. First, there may be more than one adjacency structure on S which 
satisfies the Markov property with respect to {PrE}EÍW, just as there may be more than 
one Markovian order on T. Second, the adjacency structure alone leaves many 
important geometric properties of S unspecified. For example, in many contexts, we 
would like to define a metric on S, which determines a notion of “distance” between 
points. This is obviously crucial in classical mechanics, for example. The adjacency 
structure does not determine a unique metric. We therefore now turn to the question of 
how we might arrive at such a metric. 
3.9 Duration and distance 
Recall that the set T of times is linearly ordered. In many contexts, we would like to 
define a notion of duration on T. That is, given four moments t1, t2, t3, and t4 in T, with 
t1 < t2 and t3 < t4, we would like to determine whether the time interval between t1 and 
t2 is greater or smaller than that between t3 and t4. To do this, we suppose that the 
monoid of temporal symmetries, Y, acts freely and transitively on T, and all symmetries 
in Y are order-preserving. This means that, for any times t1 and t2 in T, there is a unique 
symmetry y in Y such that y(t1) = t2, and, for any symmetry y in Y, t1 < t2 implies 
y(t1) < y(t2). We can then define a formal “subtraction” operation on T as follows. Fix 
some reference time t0. Now, for any times t1 and t2 in T, we define  
t2 – t1 = y(t2), where y is the unique temporal symmetry in Y such that y(t1) = t0. 
In particular, this implies that t – t0 = t, for any t in T. For any four points t1, t2, t3, and 
t4 in T, we say that the time interval from t1 to t2 is greater than the one from t3 to t4 if 
t2 – t1 > t4 – t3. Similarly, we can define a formal “addition” operation on T. For any 
times t1 and t2 in T, we define  
t1 + t2 = y(t2), where y is the unique temporal symmetry in Y such that y(t0) = t1. 
The set T, with the ordering < and the operation +, forms a left-linearly ordered group.58 
In many contexts, we would also like to define a metric on S, which determines a notion 
of “distance” between points in space. As we have noted, the adjacency structure does 
not determine a unique metric. But we can define a concept of distance on S by 
measuring how long it takes for information to travel from one point to the other. To 
do this, we need to use the concept of duration we have just introduced. 
Given any two regions R and R' of S, and a time t in T, we define what it means for 
region R' to be “not reachable” from region R in time t. We begin with some preliminary 
definitions. For any subset R of S, and any time t in T, let R ´ {t} denote the set 
                                               
58 Formally, (i) the operation + is associative, i.e., (t1+ t2) + t3 = t1 + (t2+ t3) for all t1, t2, t3 in T; (ii) there 
is an identity element, namely t0, such that t0 + t = t = t + t0 for all t in T; (iii) every element t in T has an 
inverse –t such that t + (–t) = t0 = (–t) + t; and (iv) the ordering < is left-homogeneous, meaning that, for 
all t1, t2, t3 in T, we have (t1 + t2 < t1 + t3) ⇔  (t2 < t3). Left-linearly ordered groups are not generally 
commutative (“abelian”), i.e., we could have t1 + t2 ≠ t2 + t1 for some t1, t2 in T. See, e.g., Fuchs (2011) 
for an introduction to ordered groups. 
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{(s,t): sÎR}. Adapting our earlier definition, we say that an event E happens inside R 
at time t if, for all histories h and h' such that hR´{t} = h'R´{t}, history h is an element of 
E if and only if history h' is an element of E. In other words, whether or not a particular 
history is an element of E is completely determined by the restriction of that history to 
the space-time region R ´ {t}. Further, let RC denote the complement of R in S, i.e., 
RC = {s Î S: s Ï R}. Given any two subsets R and R' of S, and a time t in T with t > t0, 
we now say that R' is not reachable from R in time t if, for any history h in W, any event 
which happens in R' at time t is conditionally independent of any event which happens 
in R at t0, given [hRC´{t0}]. Informally, once we have complete information about the 
state of the system outside the set R at time t0, learning something about the state of the 
system inside R at time t0 gives us no further information about the eventual state inside 
R' at the later time t.59  
We now define the distance d(R, R') between R and R' to be the maximum time t in T 
such that R' is not reachable from R in time t, if this maximum exists.60 This can be 
interpreted as the minimum time required for information to “propagate” from R to R'. 
It would be natural to suppose that this notion of distance satisfies three properties: 
Symmetry: For all subsets R, R' of S,  
d(R, R') = d(R', R). 
Triangle Inequality: For all subsets R, R', R'' of S,  
d(R, R'') ≤ d(R, R') + d(R',R''). 
Non-Complementarity: For all subsets R1, R2, R3 of S,  
d(R1 È R2, R3) = min{d(R1, R3) , d(R2, R3)}. 
However, none of these properties can be guaranteed, unless the conditional probability 
structure {PrE}EÍW has the right underlying properties. For example, if the information 
flow between different spatial locations is asymmetrical, such as in many 
communications networks, then Symmetry might not be satisfied; it might take longer 
for information to propagate from R to R' than vice versa. If information can be 
“forgotten” or “erased” at some spatial locations in the system, then the Triangle 
Inequality might not be satisfied; some information propagating from R to R' might be 
forgotten before it reaches R''. Turning to Non-Complementarity: it is always true that 
d(R1 È R2, R3) £ min{d(R1, R3) , d(R2, R3)}. However, this inequality could be strict; 
i.e., we could have d(R1 È R2, R3) < min{d(R1, R3), d(R2, R3)}. For example, what 
happens in regions R1 and R2 at time t1 could be like two pieces of a puzzle, which 
                                               
59 In our definition of “non-reachability”, we have referred to the reference time t0. However, because Y 
acts freely and transitively on T, the reference time does not matter. When region R' is not reachable from 
region R in time t, this implies that, for any times t1 and t2 with t2–t1=t, any event which happens in R' at 
time t2 is conditionally independent of any event which happens in R at t1, given [hRC´{t1}]. 
60 If the maximum does not exist, we can use the supremum, provided the order of time is supremum-
complete (i.e., any subset of T has a supremum), as it is if T is the set of real numbers. If the order of time 
is not supremum-complete, then the precise distance between R and R' may not be well-defined. 
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reveal little about what happens in region R3 at time t2 when considered separately, but 
determine it completely when put together.61 
Note that our definition of distance between regions of space immediately entails a 
definition of distance between points in space: the distance between any two points s1 
and s2 in S is simply the distance between the singleton regions consisting of them, i.e., 
d(s1, s2) = d({s1},{s2}). Clearly, d(s, s) = 0 for any point s in S. Thus, if our distance 
measure satisfies Symmetry and the Triangle Inequality, it determines a metric on the 
space S (or a pseudo-metric if d(s1, s2) = 0 for some s1 ≠ s2). Furthermore, if it satisfies 
Non-Complementarity, this metric completely determines the distance between any 
two regions R and R' in S.62 However, as we have pointed out, the distance measure 
need not generally satisfy these properties. 
One notable feature of the present approach is that it measures the distance between 
spatial locations in units of time. This is, of course, consistent with the practice in 
modern physics of measuring distance in units such as light seconds or light years. 
However, the approach works only if the maximum speed of information propagation 
in our system is finite. In classical physics, information can propagate through space at 
arbitrarily high speeds. Therefore, in a classical physical system, the effective “distance” 
between any two spatial locations collapses to zero, according to our definition. To 
recover a non-trivial definition of “distance” in such a system, we must impose some 
restriction on the sort of “information transmission” we can use. For instance, we could 
consider information transmission via some messenger or signal travelling at a fixed 
velocity. Similarly, in Maxwell’s theory of electrodynamics, which is complementary 
to classical mechanics, electromagnetic waves propagate at a fixed and finite speed, 
namely the speed of light, even if classical-mechanical particles can exceed this speed. 
Thus, in the world of classical physics, we could define a non-trivial concept of 
“electromagnetic distance”, even if there is no non-trivial concept of “mechanical 
distance”. We discuss the issue of distance in quantum mechanics in Appendix D. 
4. Amorphous systems: space-time as an emergent property 
4.1 Basic definitions 
So far, we have defined histories as functions from a set of points in time or space-time 
into some state space, where histories play the role of possible worlds. Time or space-
time, in turn, had an exogenously given structure. In a temporally evolving system, time 
was some linearly ordered set (T), and in a spatially extended system, space-time was 
explicitly decomposed into space (S) and time (T), consistent with some fixed geometry. 
This picture can, and for many purposes must, be generalized. Both special and general 
relativity theory, for example, go against the idea that there exists a fixed temporal 
dimension (for a classic discussion, see Putnam 1967).  
                                               
61 Technically, this means that there exist events E1, E2, and E3 in W which happen, respectively, in region 
R1 at time t1, in region R2 at time t1, and in region R3 at time t2 such that E1, E2, and E3 are pairwise 
independent, but not jointly independent. This situation is common in probability theory. 
62 To be precise, d(R,R') = min{d(s,s'): s Î R and s' Î R'}. Strictly speaking, this only works if R and R' 
are finite sets of points. For infinite sets, we would need a slightly stronger version of non-
complementarity, which says that d(R, R') = inf{d(s, s'): s Î R and s' Î R'} (and this infimum exists). 
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A more general approach is to define a history as a function from some “index set”, 
which we call a set of loci, into a state space. The set of loci could be a linearly ordered 
set of points in time, thereby accommodating temporally evolving systems, or a set of 
space-time locations with an explicit decomposition into space and time, thereby 
accommodating spatially extended systems. But it could also be a more general four-
dimensional space-time manifold without any exogenous decomposition, or even a 
completely abstract index set.  
Formally, let I (for “index set”) be the set of loci, and let X denote the state space. A 
generalized history is a function h from I into X, where, for each locus i in I, h(i) is the 
state of the system at locus i. As in the case of spatially extended systems, the state h(i) 
is best interpreted, not as a “global” state in which the system is at some specific point 
in time (indeed, there is no exogenous notion of time), but as a “local” state in which 
the system is at a specific locus. We write W to denote the set of all generalized histories 
deemed possible, which can again be viewed as nomologically possible worlds, and 
subsets of W are called events.63 
To complete the definition of what we call an amorphous system, we must, once more, 
introduce a conditional probability structure on W. As should be clear by now, this is a 
family of conditional probability functions {PrE}EÍW, consisting of one PrE for each 
event E in W. Now an amorphous system is the pair consisting of the set W of 
nomologically possible generalized histories and the conditional probability structure 
{PrE}EÍW.  
How much of our earlier framework can be extended to amorphous systems? We might 
ask, for instance, whether an abstract index set, despite not being endowed with any 
exogenous structure, can attain some spatial and/or temporal structure as an emergent 
property, for instance as a byproduct of the correlations encoded in {PrE}EÍW. We might 
also ask whether, and to what extent, the geometry of the set of loci is unique, or 
whether there might be multiple, equally admissible geometries. 
4.2 Adjacency structure and the Markov property 
Just as in Section 3.8, the topology of the set I of loci can be represented by an 
adjacency structure: a binary relation ®  defined between subsets of I. For example, 
suppose I is a set of times, as in Section 2, i.e., I = T. For any subsets R and R' of I, 
define R→R' if there does not exist any time t such that r < t < r' for all r in R and all r' 
in R'. For another example, let I be the four-dimensional space-time manifold of a 
general relativistic system. Then, for any subsets R and R' of I, we might define R→R' 
if there is a locus i in R such that every open neighbourhood around i intersects R'. 
In Section 2.9, we related the order structure of the set T of times to the conditional 
probability structure {PrE}EÍW by means of a temporal Markov property. Likewise, in 
Section 3.8, we related the adjacency structure of the set S of spatial locations to the 
conditional probability structure {PrE}EÍW by means of a spatial Markov property. We 
now discuss a similar idea concerning a general set of loci. This will allow us to view 
                                               
63 Note that, in the literature on general relativity theory, the word “event” is used to refer to the objects 
we call “loci”. Our use of the word “event” is consistent with its use in probability theory.  
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the adjacency structure among loci, and thereby its topology, as an “emergent property”: 
something that emerges from the correlations between events encoded in {PrE}EÍW. 
Let R be a subset of I (i.e., a collection of loci). As before, for any generalized history 
h in W, we define hR to be the restriction of that history to the set R. We then define the 
event [hR] to be the set of all histories h' in W such that hR = h'R. For any event E (i.e., a 
subset of W), we say that E happens inside R if, for all histories h and h' such that 
hR = h'R, history h is an element of E if and only if history h' is an element of E. That is, 
whether or not a particular history is an element of E is completely determined by the 
restriction of that history to R. 
As in Section 3.8, we define a tripartition of the set I of loci as a triple (R, R', R''), where 
R, R', and R'' are disjoint subsets of I which together cover I (i.e., R È R' È R'' = I), 
such that it is not the case that R ® R'' or R'' ® R. Again, this means that the set R' 
“separates” R from R''.  
For example, let I be a set of times (I = T) with the adjacency structure introduced at 
the start of this section. Fix two times t0 and t1 with t0 ≤ t1. Let R be the set of all times 
strictly before t0, let R' be the set of all times between t0 and t1 (including t0 and t1), and 
let R'' be the set of all times strictly after t1. Then (R,R',R'') is a tripartition of I.  
For another example, let I be the four-dimensional Minkowski space-time of special 
relativity, with the “open neighbourhood” adjacency structure introduced above. Let l 
be a linear time-like trajectory through I, for instance the trajectory of an “observer” 
traveling through space-time at a constant velocity, and let p be a point on this trajectory. 
In special relativity theory, there is a unique three-dimensional simultaneity hyperplane 
R' passing through p, such that all events that happen inside R' seem to occur 
simultaneously from the perspective of the l-observer at p. Let R be the set of all points 
in I which have some part of R' in their future light-cone, and let R'' be the set of all 
points in I which have some part of R' in their past light-cone. Then (R, R', R'') is a 
tripartition of I.64 More generally, let R and R'' be any disjoint open subsets of I,65 and 
let R' be the complement of the union R È R''. Then (R, R', R'') is a tripartition of I.  
We say that the adjacency structure ® satisfies the amorphous Markov property with 
respect to the conditional probability structure {PrE}EÍW if, for any tripartition 
(R, R', R'') and any generalized history h in W, any event which happens inside R is 
conditionally independent from any event which happens inside R'', given [hR']. Again, 
this means, roughly, that there is no way for information to propagate from R into R'', 
or vice versa, without first passing through R'. For example, suppose I is four-
dimensional Minkowski space-time, and (R, R', R'') is the tripartition described above. 
In this case, the simultaneity hyperplane R' plays the role of the “present”, which 
isolates the “past” R from the “future” R''. If we have complete information about the 
history inside R' (i.e., we know [hR']), then we have complete information about the 
“present state” of the world. Thus, we can predict its future evolution (in R'') without 
needing to know anything about its past history (in R).  
                                               
64 In a model of general relativity, a similar construction works if R' is a Cauchy surface in the four-
dimensional space-time manifold. 
65 A subset R of I is open if, for any s in R, there is some r > 0 such that the ball of radius r around s is 
contained in R. 
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In Section 2.9, we argued that the temporal Markov property was the key property of 
time; a “correct” ordering of the set T was any ordering that satisfied this property. 
Likewise, in Section 3.8, we argued that the spatial Markov property was the key 
property of space; a “correct” adjacency structure on the set S was any adjacency 
structure that satisfied this property. Now we make a parallel claim for amorphous 
systems: a “correct” adjacency structure on I is one that satisfies the amorphous Markov 
property. This Markov property subsumes both the temporal Markov property of 
Section 2 and the spatial Markov property of Section 3. 
This has an important consequence. The topology of the index set I, in the form of the 
adjacency structure, does not need to be imposed exogenously. Instead, this topology 
can emerge endogenously from the conditional probability structure {PrE}EÍW. We say 
that an adjacency structure ® between subsets of I is {PrE}EÍW-admissible if it satisfies 
the amorphous Markov property with respect to {PrE}EÍW. If we think of I as a sort of 
generalized space-time, this means that the topology of space-time is an emergent 
property of the amorphous system.66  
4.3 Time and predictability 
Both temporally evolving systems and spatially extended systems come with a set T 
which plays the role of “time”. What plays the role of time in an amorphous system? 
The adjacency structure described in the previous section tells us whether two subsets 
of the index set I are in “informational contact” or are “informationally separated” from 
one another, but it does not tell us which subset comes “before” and which comes 
“after”, or even whether this question makes sense. We now explain how time itself can 
be an emergent property of an amorphous system. 
Let ® be an adjacency structure on the index set I. Let T be a linearly ordered set. A 
possible time structure on I is a function t from I onto T (i.e., with T = t(I)) such that, 
for any t in T, if (i) R is the set of all points i in I such that t(i) < t, (ii) R' is the set of all 
points i in I such that t(i) = t, and (iii) R'' is the set of all points i in I such that t(i) > t, 
then (R, R', R'') is a tripartition of I. Heuristically, the function t specifies, for each 
locus in I, the time at which that locus occurs, according to the given time structure. 
For example, let I be four-dimensional Minkowski space-time as described in Section 
4.2, and let l be a linear time-like trajectory through I. Fix some point p0 on the 
trajectory l. Let T be the set of real numbers. Then, for every t in T, there is a unique 
point pt along the trajectory l which appears to be t seconds in the future of p0 (or in 
the past, if t < 0), with respect to the subjective time (i.e., proper time) experienced by 
an observer traveling along the trajectory l. Let Rt be the simultaneity hyperplane 
                                               
66 We are not the first to suggest that the geometry and/or topology of space-time could be an emergent 
property of more fundamental causal structures. Brown and Pooley (2001, 2006) have argued that the 
geometry of relativistic space-time should be seen as a consequence of the symmetries (i.e., Lorentz 
covariance) of the dynamical laws governing matter and electromagnetism. In their words (2006, Section 
5): “space-time’s Minkowskian structure cannot be taken to explain the Lorentz covariance of the 
dynamical laws. From our perspective, of course, the direction of explanation goes the other way around. 
It is the Lorentz covariance of the laws that underwrites the fact that the geometry of space-time is 
Minkowskian.” See also Brown (2005). However, Brown and Pooley’s approach is very different from 
ours. The idea of emergent space-time geometry also appears in the literature on high-energy physics 
and quantum cosmology. See, e.g., Konopka et al. (2008) and Hamma et al. (2010). 
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passing through pt. If we define t(i) = t for all points i in Rt, then t is a possible time 
structure on I.  
As this example illustrates, an amorphous system may admit many possible time 
structures. In special relativity, there is a distinct time-structure for every inertial 
reference frame. All of these time structures are equally “correct”. Indeed, this is one 
of the key insights of special relativity theory. However, unless we impose further 
constraints, a system may also admit many “absurd” time structures. For example, 
suppose I is four-dimensional Newtonian space-time (i.e., I = R3 ´ R), with the “open 
neighbourhood” adjacency structure described in Section 4.2. For all points (s1, s2, s3, t) 
in I, define t(s1, s2, s3, t) = s3. Then t is a possible time structure on I. But if the “true” 
time coordinate is t, not s3, it seems that this time structure is not correct. So, what 
property of the system determines which time structures are the correct ones? 
Clearly, a “correct” time structure should satisfy something like the temporal Markov 
property from Section 2. However, if the adjacency structure ® satisfies the amorphous 
Markov property with respect to the conditional probability structure {PrE}EÍW, then it 
is easy to see that any possible time structure will satisfy the temporal Markov property.67 
So, the Markov property alone is not enough to pick out the “correct” time structures. 
Arguably, what picks out the correct time structures is predictability. To understand 
this, suppose we took a classical mechanical system with Newtonian space-time 
I = R3 ´ R, and applied the “absurd” time structure t(s1, s2, s3, t) = s3, as defined above. 
How would the system appear with respect to this time structure? It would appear very 
strange and unpredictable. Particles would randomly pop in and out of existence. 
Energy and momentum would not be conserved from one moment to the next. Events 
would seem to unfold over time without any rhyme or reason. This total lack of 
predictability would be an indication that we had picked the wrong time structure for 
the system. 
On the other hand, if we had picked the “correct” time structure, namely 
t(s1, s2, s3, t) = t, then the system would appear completely deterministic; its state at one 
“moment” in time, as defined by t, would completely determine its “past” and “future” 
behaviour, as defined by t. This total predictability is an indication that this is the 
correct time structure for the system. 
In this example, there was a particularly stark contrast between an “incorrect” time 
structure, which renders the system totally unpredictable, and a “correct” one, which 
renders it totally predictable. This is because classical mechanical systems are 
deterministic. In an indeterministic system, there will not generally be such a stark 
contrast. Nevertheless, some time structures will render the system more predictable 
than others, and among these, we claim, the ones that render the system most 
predictable are the correct time structures for that system. 
To make this idea more precise, we need a way to measure the “predictability” of a 
system under a given time structure. One way to do this is to use the information-
                                               
67 To be more precise: given a possible time structure on I, we can represent the amorphous system as a 
temporally evolving system, and this system, in turn, will satisfy the temporal Markov property. The 
construction is straightforward, but to avoid too many technicalities, we set aside the details here. 
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theoretic notion of entropy.68 For any subset R of I, let WR be the set of all R-restricted 
histories hR obtained from any h in W. For simplicity, let us assume that the underlying 
state space X is finite. If R' is some other finite subset of I, then WR' is also finite.69 
Suppose we know hR, and we want to predict hR'. For any hR in WR, there is a quantity 
called the conditional entropy of R' given hR, denoted by h(R',hR), which measures how 
“unpredictable” the restricted history hR' is, given the restricted history hR. 70  For 
example, if hR' is entirely determined by hR, then h(R',hR) = 0. At the other extreme, if 
hR' is effectively as unpredictable as a collection of independent coin-tosses, even after 
conditioning on hR, then h(R',hR) = 1. Intermediate levels of entropy represent 
intermediate degrees of unpredictability.  
Now, let t be a time structure, mapping I into T. Let t be some time in T; let R be the 
set of all points i in I such that t(i) = t; and let RC be the set of all points i in I such that 
t(i) ≠ t. We define h(t, t), the unpredictability of the system under t at t, to be the 
maximum value of h(R', hR), where hR can be any element of WR and R' is allowed to 
be any finite subset of RC.71 If h(t, t)=0, then this means roughly that any generalized 
history h in W is almost entirely predictable, based on its restriction hR.72 If h(t,t) > 0, 
then histories in W are not, in general, fully predictable from their restrictions to R. The 
larger h(t, t) is, the less predictable these histories are. We then define h(t), the 
unpredictability of the system under the time structure t, to be the maximum value of 
h(t, t) over all times t in T.73 
For example, suppose I is the four-dimensional Newtonian space-time of a classical 
mechanical system (i.e., I = R3 ´   R), and t is the “correct” time structure for this system, 
namely t(s1, s2, s3, t) = t. Then h(t) = 0, because classical mechanics is entirely 
deterministic. However, if t was an “incorrect” time structure, such as t(s1, s2, s3, t) = s3, 
then we would have h(t) > 0, because the ascription of this incorrect time structure 
would render the system unpredictable, as we have explained.  
We now come to the key point of this section. A correct time structure for an amorphous 
system is one that minimizes unpredictability and thereby maximizes regularity. This 
definition allows that there may be many correct time structures, all of which render 
the system equally predictable, as in the case in special or general relativity. This has 
an important consequence. The correct time structure does not need to be imposed 
                                               
68 This is not the same as thermodynamic entropy, although it is loosely related. Thus, the discussion that 
follows should not be interpreted thermodynamically.  
69 If |X| and |R'| are the cardinalities of X and R', then the cardinality of WR' is at most |X||R'|. 
70 Formally, h(R', hR) is the sum, over all possible R'-restrictions hR' in WR', of  
–Pr([hR'] | [hR]) log2[Pr([hR'] | [hR])] / |R'| log2(|X|). 
However, the precise formula is not important for this discussion. 
71 To be more precise, it is the supremum of this set. The maximum is not always well-defined. 
72 Even if h(t,t) = 0, there may be some “residual” unpredictability, in that W may contain more than one 
extension of hR to all of I. However, the conditional probability structure {PrE}EÍW concentrates all 
probability on one of these possible extensions; the rest of the extensions get probability zero. 
73 Again, strictly speaking, we require the supremum of h(t,t) across all t. This is not the only possible 
measure of the system’s unpredictability under time structure t. We could also take the average or some 
other aggregate measure. For example, suppose that I is an N-dimensional integer lattice (i.e., I = ZN). 
Then we could measure the system’s unpredictability under different time structures using the theory of 
entropy geometry and expansive subdynamics first developed for multidimensional cellular automata by 
Milnor (1988) and later extended to arbitrary multidimensional symbolic dynamical systems by Boyle 
and Lind (1997). See the section on “Entropy” in Pivato (2009) for a summary. 
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exogenously. Instead, the correct time structure (or structures) could emerge 
endogenously from the conditional probability structure {PrE}EÍW. In other words, the 
structure of time itself could be an emergent property of the amorphous system. Using 
a more metaphysical language, it might be that space and time are grounded in the 
dynamics of the system, rather than the other way around. 
4.4 Which features of a system are real? 
A final philosophical question on which we wish to comment briefly is the following. 
Suppose we have described a given system using our formal framework. Should we 
treat all features of that system as “real”, or should we treat some features as mere 
artefacts of our formal description?  
The debates between relational and substantival views about space and time, and 
between structuralist and full-blown realist views in science more generally, can be 
seen as attempts to answer this question.74 Let us begin with a relational or structuralist 
view, which may be about space and time in particular or about the properties of a 
system more generally. On such a view (of which there can be several variants), only 
some “relational” or “structural” properties of a system count as real, while “intrinsic”, 
“non-structural” properties do not. It does not matter, for instance, what the nature of 
the system’s spatiotemporal loci in the set I is, nor what the nature of the system’s 
possible states in the set X is. All that matters is how these loci and/or states are related 
to one another and what dynamics they display. Two formally distinct systems, with 
formally distinct index sets I and I' and/or formally distinct state spaces X and X', will 
count as the same if their nomologically possible histories and conditional probability 
structures are structurally indistinguishable. 
By contrast, on a substantival or full-blown realist view, which may also be about space 
and time in particular or about the properties of a system more generally, even intrinsic, 
non-structural properties of a system can be real, over and above the system’s relational 
or structural properties. So, the system’s spatiotemporal index set I and its state space 
X may be significant in ways that go beyond the structures and relations in which they 
stand. (Again, there can be several variants of such a view.) An example of a non-
structural property is the exact index of time. One can imagine two structurally identical 
temporally evolving systems, indexed by T = {0,1,2,3,....} and T' = {1,2,3,4,....}, 
respectively. The only difference is that in one system history “starts at time zero”, 
whereas in the other it “starts at time 1”. For a relationalist or structuralist, these are 
“the same” system. But a substantivalist or full-blown realist might insist that there is 
a genuine difference between them. 
The debates between these different views occur in several places in philosophy and 
take a variety of forms, so we cannot do justice to them here. We wish to note, however, 
that our formal framework can be used to express some salient positions within those 
debates. Specifically, different answers to the question of which features of a system 
are real can be expressed in terms of different criteria for individuating systems. If we 
begin with a very large class of systems that are formally described in our framework, 
there are a number of ways in which one might partition this class of systems into 
                                               
74 On a broadly “structuralist” or “relational” approach to metaphysics, see, e.g., Ladyman and Ross 
(2009). On “absolute” versus “relational” accounts of space and time, see, e.g., Earman (1989). On 
“substantivalism” and its discontents, see, e.g., Nerlich (2003). 
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equivalence classes that are each taken to represent the same system. Different such 
partitions then correspond to different answers to the question of which features of a 
system are real, rather than mere artefacts of our formal description. In particular, only 
those features that are present among all members of any given equivalence class count 
as real. Features on which there can be differences even within the same equivalence 
class count as artefacts of our formal description.  
A relational or structuralist view would entail that any two systems that do not differ in 
any relational or structural properties count as the same and thereby fall into the same 
equivalence class. A substantival or full-blown realist view, by contrast, would entail 
that two such systems could still count as different; thus, the equivalence classes would 
be more fine-grained according to such a view, and might even be singleton (in which 
case all features of any given system would count as real).   
Here is one way of formalizing this idea. Consider two amorphous systems, given by 
the pairs (W, {PrE}EÍW) and (W', {Pr'E}EÍW'), where the histories in W are functions from 
the set I of loci into the state space X, and the histories in W' are functions from the set 
I' of loci into the state space X'. Let H and H' denote the sets of logically possible 
functions from I into X and from I' into X', respectively. 
Suppose there is a bijection q from I into I', and also a bijection x from X into X' (recall 
that a bijection is a one-to-one, onto function). Using q and x, we can then define a 
bijection s from H into H' which maps each history h in H to the history h' in H' defined 
as follows: for each i' in I',  
h'(i') = x[h(i)], where i = q–1(i') (with q–1 defined as the inverse of q). 
The bijection s is an isomorphism between the two systems if  
• s(W) = W'; and 
• for any events E' and D' in W', if E and D are the inverse images of E' and D' 
under s, then Pr'E'(D') = PrE(D). 
We call two systems isomorphic if there exists an isomorphism between them. 
Isomorphic systems display the same dynamics, and they are relationally or structurally 
indistinguishable.75 Moreover, any topology of space and time that is admissible for 
one such system can be mapped, in a structure-preserving way, onto a topology that is 
admissible for the other.  
Thus, on a relational or structuralist view, any two isomorphic systems should be 
considered the same. On a substantival or full-blown realist view, they may still differ. 
A view of the first kind would therefore take systems to be unique only up to 
isomorphism, so that our initial large class of systems would be partitioned into 
equivalence classes of isomorphic systems. A view of the second kind would opt for a 
more fine-grained partition, acknowledging that even isomorphic systems may be 
distinct in reality. 
The properties of systems on which we have focused in this paper are mainly structural 
and are preserved by all isomorphisms. This includes the symmetries and ergodic 
                                               
75 In fact, any bijective symmetry of a system constitutes an isomorphism from a system into itself. 
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properties of a system, the distinction between laws and “brute necessities”, and the 
topology (or topologies) and geometry (or geometries) of space and time that are 
compatible with the system’s correlation structure (in the sense that they satisfy the 
relevant Markov conditions). Thus, even a relationalist or structuralist would accept 
that all these properties are “real” features of the system, and not mere artefacts. 
5. Concluding discussion 
We have introduced a framework for describing three general classes of systems and 
shown how it can be used to address a number of philosophical questions. We began 
with the class of temporally evolving systems, of which classical dynamical systems 
are a special case, and then moved on to the class of spatially extended systems and the 
class of amorphous systems. As noted, the framework can accommodate systems as 
diverse as the solar system, quantum-mechanical systems, special and general 
relativistic systems, and the earth’s climate system. 
We have discussed questions such as: how can we define nomological possibility, 
necessity, determinism, and indeterminism? What is special about laws, and how are 
laws related to symmetries? What regularities must a system display to permit global 
generalizations from local observations? How can we formulate principles of parsimony 
such as Occam’s Razor? What is the role of space and time in a system? And what is 
at stake in the debate between relational and substantival views about space and time, 
and between structuralist and full-blown realist views about systems more generally? 
While our framework and what it says about these questions should already be of 
sufficient interest to make it worth studying, a further payoff lies arguably in the variety 
of applications to which the framework lends itself. Developing these is beyond the 
scope of this paper, but we conclude by mentioning a few. 
5.1 Higher-level versus lower-level properties 
Our framework can be used to explore the relationship between lower-level (“micro”) 
and higher-level (“macro”) properties of a system. By partitioning the system’s state 
space X into suitable equivalence classes, we can capture the idea that “higher-level” 
or “macro” states are more coarse-grained than “lower-level” or “micro” states, so that 
each “macro” state can be realized by different “micro” states: the phenomenon of 
multiple realizability. Consider, for example, all the different possible micro-level 
trajectories of a tossed coin that each correspond to the macro-property of “landing 
heads”. Or consider all the different possible micro-states of individual water molecules 
that each correspond to a macro-state such as “frozen”, “liquid”, or “gaseous”.  
Suppose X is the original state space, and  is the relevant set of equivalence classes, 
which we interpret as the higher-level state space. We can then write s to denote the 
function that maps each lower-level state x in X to the corresponding higher-level state 
 in . Note the outlined font for higher-level objects. This function can be interpreted 
as the supervenience relation connecting the two levels. We can then use s to specify 
the resulting higher-level histories.76 For each lower-level history h in the original set 
W, the corresponding higher-level history  is the function from T into , where, for 
                                               
76 This construction, under the present notational conventions, was introduced in List (2014) and List 
and Pivato (2015). Relatedly, see also Yoshimi (2012). 
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each t in T, (t) = s(h(t)). (If we are dealing with a spatially extended or amorphous 
system instead of a temporally evolving one, we must replace T in this definition with 
S ´ T or I.) The set of higher-level histories is therefore = s(W). Similarly, we can 
use s to arrive at a conditional probability structure defined over higher-level events, 
formally written { } Í . See Appendix A for details. The pair ( ,{ } Í ) can be 
viewed as our system, re-described at a higher level. In the terminology of Appendix 
A, the higher-level system is a factor system of the original, lower-level system.  
This construction allows us to study the dynamics of the higher-level system and to 
compare its properties with those of the lower-level system. Interestingly, the higher-
level dynamics may be different from the underlying lower-level dynamics. For 
example, features such as determinism or indeterminism are not generally preserved 
under coarse-graining: the lower-level system may be deterministic, while the higher-
level system is not (or vice versa). Thus indeterminism could be an emergent property 
(see, e.g., Butterfield 2012, List 2014, List and Pivato 2015, and relatedly Werndl 2009b).  
In a similar vein, we may study the level-specificity of other properties. For instance, 
this approach can be used to argue that non-trivial objective chance can be an emergent 
phenomenon, consistently with lower-level determinism (List and Pivato 2015).77 
5.2 Laws and regularities in the special sciences 
There is much debate on whether there are laws in the special sciences, as distinct from 
fundamental physics. The existence of laws is particularly contested in fields such as 
biology, ecology, geology, psychology, and the social sciences. (Chemistry, by contrast, 
is often viewed as a close relative of physics and thereby similar enough to it in its 
lawfulness.) Examples of special-science regularities that are sometimes described as 
laws include (i) Kleiber’s law in biology, according to which an organism’s metabolic 
rate is proportional to the ¾th power of its body mass; (ii) the laws of supply and demand 
in economics, according to which (except for Giffen goods) the demand for a good is a 
decreasing function of its price, and the supply is an increasing function of price; and 
(iii) Duverger’s law in political science, according to which, under a first-past-the-post 
electoral system, the effective number of parties in the legislature will be lower than 
under a proportional-representation system, ceteris paribus. The key question is 
whether any of these regularities are sufficiently robust to qualify as laws. 
One common view is that, as we move further away from fundamental physics, there 
are fewer and fewer regularities that are genuinely law-like. Kim (2010, ch. 14), for 
instance, argues that there are no “strict” laws in the special sciences. Among the 
reasons he gives for this conclusion are (i) the multiple realizability of special-science 
properties, which, he claims, undermines their “inductive projectibility”, and (ii) the 
alleged metaphysical anomalism of the mental realm, which, he suggests, undermines 
the existence of laws in psychology and the social sciences.  
Other scholars defend the existence of laws in the special sciences. For example, 
focusing on the social sciences, Kincaid (1990) argues that several widely cited 
arguments against laws fail. He thinks that the most serious challenge to laws in the 
social sciences comes from the excessive ceteris paribus qualifications that all such 
                                               
77 For earlier work defending higher-level chance, sometimes using a strategy similar in spirit to the 
present one (though not fully equivalent), see, e.g., Loewer (2001), Frigg and Hoefer (2010), Glynn 
(2010), Strevens (2011), and Hemmo and Shenker (2012). 
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laws require, but argues that the procedures we routinely employ to deal with such 
qualifications in the natural sciences carry over to the social sciences. 
Our framework might be used to make some progress in this debate. Using the 
framework, we can in principle describe the special-science systems in question and 
identify the properties these systems would have to display in order to secure the 
existence of laws. Those laws would then have the testable and generalizable character 
we have discussed. As we have seen, what laws there are in a given system depends on 
the system’s symmetries and the properties they preserve. This is as true for a system 
in the special sciences as it is for a physical system. Moreover, our analysis implies that 
whether, given only local observations, we can gain knowledge of the probabilistic 
dynamics of a special-science system depends on whether the system is ergodic. The 
importance of ergodicity for the special sciences is much less widely recognized than 
its importance for physics.  
Interestingly, if a special-science system arises as a higher-level description of a 
physical system, as discussed in Section 5.1, then it will inherit some structure from the 
physical system, and it will have at least as many temporal or spatiotemporal 
symmetries as that physical system (and possibly more), and at least as much ergodicity, 
for reasons explained in Appendix A. Another question is whether we are prepared to 
recognize weaker kinds of laws corresponding to partial or local symmetries, as 
defined in Appendix B. This question is particularly pertinent for the special sciences, 
insofar as the systems investigated in fields ranging from biology to the social sciences 
often have special initial or boundary conditions. While all of these issues are difficult, 
our framework can help us clarify what is at stake in the debate about special-science 
laws and thereby render the debate more tractable. For earlier applications of 
dynamical-systems theory to the special sciences, see Auyang (1998) and Yoshimi 
(2012). 
5.3 Intentional systems 
Although there has been no such thing as intentionality in our paradigmatic examples 
of systems, there is no barrier, in principle, to using our framework also for describing 
systems involving intentional agents. Indeed, van Gelder (1995) and Juarrero (1998) 
have argued for understanding cognitive systems as special kinds of dynamical systems 
(see also Spivey 2008, Hotton and Yoshimi 2010, and Silberstein and Chemero 2012); 
and more recently, a precursor of the present formalism has proved useful for the 
analysis of free will and agency (List 2014, List and Rabinowicz 2014). We can think 
of an agent, together with the relevant environment, as a temporally evolving system. 
This system can be described at different levels: at a physical level, at which we would 
not take an “intentional stance” towards the system, and at an agential level, at which 
we would take such a stance (on the notion of an “intentional stance”, see Dennett 1987). 
Physical-level descriptions capture the states of the agent’s brain and body, while 
agential-level descriptions capture the agent’s higher-level mental or psychological 
states, thereby focusing on the agent’s beliefs, desires, and intentions, rather than the 
underlying neuronal or bodily states. 
The present framework then allows us to explain, for instance, how agential-level 
indeterminism and an agent’s possibility of doing otherwise can co-exist with physical-
level determinism (List 2014). The framework might also shed some light on how other 
 48 
psychological properties can emerge from the underlying physical dynamics of the 
system. In particular, as a factor system of the original physical system, the agential 
system may exhibit additional symmetries not present at the physical level – a point 
already alluded to in Section 5.2. This may, in turn, be used to explain why some higher-
level regularities in an intentional system (e.g., regularities involving beliefs, desires, 
intentions, and norms) may qualify as “real patterns”, as Dennett (1991) has argued, 
and not merely as illusions due to our ignorance of the physical-level details. 
Needless to say, all of these applications are challenging and raise controversial 
philosophical issues. We hope, however, that our framework will be a clarifying 
contribution to formal metaphysics and the philosophy of science and will inspire 
further work.  
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Appendix A: Factor systems 
One possible objection to our framework is that it is both unrealistic and unwieldy. It 
is unrealistic because the actual universe is not sufficiently regular (e.g., it might lack 
a large enough monoid of symmetries or ergodicity). It is unwieldy because the universe 
as a whole is far too complex a system for us to analyze within this framework anyway. 
However, there is no need to insist on applying our framework to the universe as a 
whole. Instead, we can apply it to a “factor” system, as we now explain. Consider a 
temporally evolving system, consisting of a set W of nomologically possible histories 
(each of which is a function from a set T of times into a set X of possible states), along 
with a conditional probability structure {PrE}EÍW. Let X' be another set, and let s be a 
function from X into X'. For every history h in W, let s(h) be the function h' from T into 
X' defined by h'(t) = s(h(t)) for all t in T. Let W' = {s(h): h Î W}. For any subsets D' and 
E' of W', let D and E be their inverse images under s, where these are subsets of W, and 
define Pr'E'(D') = PrE(D). Then {Pr'E'}E'ÍW' is a conditional probability structure on W'. 
The system specified by W' and {Pr'E'}E'ÍW' is called a factor system of the original 
system specified by W and {PrE}EÍW. The function s from W into W' is called a factor 
map. We can define factors of spatially extended and amorphous systems analogously. 
For a concrete example, suppose that (W, {PrE}EÍW) is a classical-physics description 
of the entire solar system at an atomic level of detail. So X is an extremely high-
dimensional space, which must specify the position and momentum of every atom in 
the entire solar system, along with all of their gravitational and electromagnetic 
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interactions.78 Meanwhile, let (W', {Pr'E'}E'ÍW') be the very simple celestial-mechanical 
system consisting only of the Earth, Moon, and Sun, described as gravitationally 
interacting point masses. So X' = R18, because we must specify the three-dimensional 
position and momentum vectors of each of the three objects in the system, and 3´6 = 
18. Let s be the function from X into X' which translates each highly detailed atomic-
level description of the solar system into the crude 18-dimensional celestial mechanical 
description. Then s is a factor mapping from (W, {PrE}EÍW) into (W', {Pr'E'}E'ÍW'), and 
thus (W', {Pr'E'}E'ÍW') is a factor of (W, {PrE}EÍW).  
As this example illustrates, a factor system can be seen as a sort of “abstraction” or 
“simplification” of the original system, obtained by discarding some properties. Now, 
suppose y is a function from T into itself (e.g., a time shift) which is a temporal 
symmetry of the original system (W, {PrE}EÍW). Then it is easy to verify that y will also 
be a temporal symmetry of the factor system (W', {Pr'E'}E'ÍW'). Thus, the temporal 
symmetry monoid of the factor system (W', {Pr'E'}E'ÍW') is at least as large as the 
temporal symmetry monoid of the original system (W, {PrE}EÍW). In a spatially 
extended system, the exact same statement applies to spatiotemporal symmetries. 
Furthermore, if Y is an amenable monoid of temporal (or spatiotemporal) symmetries, 
and (W, {PrE}EÍW) is ergodic relative to Y, then (W', {Pr'E'}E'ÍW') will also be ergodic 
relative to Y. In other words, (W', {Pr'E'}E'ÍW') is at least as ergodic as (W, {PrE}EÍW). 
This means that, even if the original system (W, {PrE}EÍW) lacks certain symmetries or 
ergodic properties, the factor system (W', {Pr'E'}E'ÍW') may well possess these properties. 
Furthermore, even if the original system (W, {PrE}EÍW) is too complicated to analyze 
using the formal tools we have described, the system (W', {Pr'E'}E'ÍW') may well be 
simple enough. To illustrate this, consider our example of the solar system. The original 
system (W, {PrE}EÍW) describes the entire solar system at an atomic level of detail. 
Whether or not the system possesses the desired symmetries or ergodic properties, it is 
certainly too complex to analyze. In contrast, the abstract Earth-Moon-Sun system 
(W', {Pr'E'}E'ÍW') is very simple. In fact, it is an example of a quasiperiodic dynamical 
system: it can be described as two independently rotating “wheels”, one describing the 
orbit of the Moon around the Earth, and the other describing the orbit of the Earth 
around the Sun. This is a prototypical example of an ergodic dynamical system. 
Appendix B: Partial symmetries and local symmetries 
An important assumption of this paper has been that there is a fairly large monoid Y of 
symmetries acting on the set W of nomologically possible histories. We have argued 
that a property of the system qualifies as a “law” only if it is invariant under all of these 
symmetries. But this argument runs into a problem: many systems studied in the 
sciences lack sufficient symmetries to account for all of their “law-like” features. 
For example, suppose space is represented by the set of all integers, while time is 
represented by the set of positive integers, i.e., S = {...,–1,0,1,2,...} and T = {1,2,3,...}, 
and consider the simple random-walk system described in Section 2.9. Nomologically 
speaking, the token could begin at any spatial location at time one. But suppose the 
conditional probability structure {PrE}EÍW is such that, with probability one, the token 
                                               
78 For simplicity, we eschew a quantum-mechanical description in this example. 
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begins at spatial location zero at time one.79 In that case, the probability distribution of 
its location at time t is a (t–1, ½)-binomial distribution.80 Evidently, this distribution is 
not invariant under spatial translations, since it is centred around zero. Furthermore, it 
changes over time. Thus, spatiotemporal translations are not symmetries of this system. 
But this contradicts our intuition that the motion of the token is highly “law-like”: it 
can be described by a simple rule which is the same everywhere in space and time. 
To solve this problem, we now introduce the notion of “partial” symmetries. We use 
the framework of spatially extended systems. Recall that H is the set all logically 
possible spatially extended histories. A partial symmetry monoid of a spatially extended 
system is a collection Y of transformations of H, along with a collection E of ordered 
pairs of events (E, D), such that: 
• y(W) = W for all y in Y; and 
• for any event pair (E′,D′) in E and any y in Y, if E and D are the inverse images 
(in W) of E′ and D′ under y, then (E,D) is also in E, and PrE(D) = PrE'(D').81 
For example, in our random-walk example (re-construed in the framework of spatially 
extended systems), let E be the set of all ordered pairs of events (E, D) such that event 
E exactly specifies the location of the particle at some time t, while event D happens at 
some later time t′. Thus, PrE(D) is the conditional probability that the token satisfies 
such-and-such property at time t′, given that it was at such-and-such location at time t. 
Let Y be the monoid of all spatiotemporal translations of S ´ T. If y is any element of 
G, then the set E of pairs of events is invariant under y, and the conditional probability 
PrE(D) is preserved by y for any (E,D) in E, in the sense described above. Thus, the 
pair (Y,E) is a partial symmetry monoid for the random-walk system. Crucially, the set 
E does not include pairs of the form (W, D), so we do not require unconditional 
probabilities of the form PrΩ(D) to be preserved by spatiotemporal translations. 
Seen from this perspective, the transition probabilities of the random walk are “law-
like”, because they are preserved by all the transformations in Y. In contrast, the initial 
probability distribution of the system is merely a brute necessity of the present system, 
since it is not preserved by any symmetries. 
For another example suppose that the temporally evolving (or spatially extended) 
system (W', {Pr'E'}E'ÍW') is a factor of the system (W, {PrE}EÍW), via some factor map 
s, as described in Appendix A. For any event E' Í W', let s–1(E') denote its inverse 
image under s (here defined as a subset of W). Then define E = {(s–1(E'), s–1(D')): E', 
D' Í W'}. Let Y be a monoid of spatiotemporal symmetries of the factor system 
(W', {Pr'E'}E'ÍW'). The elements of Y might not be symmetries of the original system 
(W, {PrE}EÍW). However, they will be partial symmetries, with respect to the set E. So 
(Y, E) is a partial symmetry monoid for (W, {PrE}EÍW). As already explained in 
Appendix A, one can greatly extend the scope of our framework by focusing attention 
                                               
79 The following argument does not depend on this assumption. Indeed, our argument would apply to 
any initial probability distribution for the token. Note that there is no such thing as a uniform probability 
distribution over the set of integers. 
80 To be precise: if t is odd, and t' = t–1, then for any even s between –t'/2 and t'/2, the probability that 
the token will be at spatial location s at time t is 2-t'B((t'+s)/2, t'), where B is the binomial coefficient 
function. The formula for even times is similar, but more complicated. 
81 Formally, E = y-1(E′) ∩ W and D = y-1(D′) ∩ W. 
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on a factor system rather than the original system. We now see that this is a special case 
of the broader concept of a partial symmetry monoid. 
However, partial symmetry monoids cannot accommodate another feature of many 
systems. To illustrate this, consider a temporally evolving system where time is a finite 
sequence of integers, such as T = {1,2,...,100}. For such a system, time translations are 
not even well-defined.82 But in most such systems, we still want to say that the system 
obeys the same causal laws at all times, except perhaps at times 0 and 100. A similar 
problem arises in a spatially extended system where the space S is bounded (e.g., a 
partial differential equation defined on a cube, with specified boundary conditions) or 
a finite set of points (e.g., a cellular automaton defined on a 100 ´ 100 grid, with 
specified boundary conditions). In such a system, spatial translations are not well-
defined. But in most such systems, we still want to say that the system obeys the same 
causal laws everywhere in the “interior” of the spatial domain. 
To solve this problem, we now introduce “local” symmetries. We begin with some 
preliminary definitions. Let N be a subset of S ´ T; call this a neighbourhood of space-
time. Extending our earlier terminology, we say that an event E Í W happens inside N 
if, for all histories h and h′ in W, if hN = h′N, then hN is in E if and only if h′N is in E. Let 
WN = {hN : h in W}; this is the set of all nomologically possible histories restricted to N 
(a set of functions from N into X). Let N′ be another neighbourhood of S ´ T, and 
suppose y is a function from N′ into N. We use this to construct a function from 
histories restricted to N into histories restricted to N′. Specifically, for any hN in WN, we 
define y(hN) to be the function h′N′ from N′ into X given by h′N′ (n′) = hN(y(n′)), for all 
n′ in N′. Note that while h′N′ is a logically possible history restricted to N′, it is not 
necessarily an element of WN′.  
We now define a local symmetry groupoid of a spatially extended system to be a 
combination of three components: 
• a collection N of subsets of S ´ T (called neighbourhoods); 
• for each neighbourhood N in N, a set EN of ordered pairs of events (E, D) which 
happen inside N (called local events); and 
• for each pair of neighbourhoods N and N′ in N, a collection YN,N′ of bijections 
from N′ into N (called local symmetries). 
We refer to the collection {YN,N′ : N, N′ Î N} as a groupoid because it must satisfy two 
algebraic closure properties: 
• for all neighbourhoods M and N in N, and any local symmetries y in YM,N, its 
inverse y–1 is in YN,M; and 
• for all neighbourhoods L, N, and M in N, and all local symmetries a in YL,M and 
b in YM,N, the composition a ° b is in YL,N. 
For any neighbourhoods N and N′ in N, and any y in YN,N′, we call y a local symmetry 
because it must preserve the modal and probabilistic structure of the system in the 
following sense: 
                                               
82 For example, suppose we try to define y(t) = t+1 for all t in T; then y(100) is not well-defined, because 
101 is not an element of T. 
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• y(WN) = WN′; and 
• for all event pairs (E′,D′) in EN′, if E and D are the inverse images (in WN) of E′ 
and D′ under y, then (E,D) is in EN, and PrE(D) = PrE′(D′ ).83 
For example, suppose that S = {1,2,....,10} and T={1,2,...,100}. For any s in {2,...,9} 
and t in {2,...,99}, let Ns,t be the 3 ´ 2 “space-time rectangle” of the form Ns,t = {s-1, s, 
s+1} ´ {t , t+1}. Let N be the set of all such space-time rectangles. For any s and s′ in 
{2,...,9}, and any t and t′ in {2,...,99}, if N = Ns,t and N′ = Ns′,t′, then we define YN,N′ = 
{ys′,t′→s,t}, where ys′,t′→s,t is the function from N′ into N which sends each space-time 
point (s0, t0) in N′ to the point (s0 - s′ + s, t0 - t′ + t) in N. Then, with a suitable specification 
of the local event sets EN for all N in N, we could construct a local symmetry groupoid 
for many of the spatially extended systems (such as cellular automata) that one might 
define on S ´ T. However, a fully worked out example would be rather technically 
involved and is beyond the scope of this paper; see Golubitsky, Pivato, and Stewart 
(2003) and Guay and Hepburn (2009).  
Most of the ideas we have developed in this paper for the monoid of “full” symmetries 
can be generalized to partial symmetries and local symmetries. However, this is also 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
Appendix C: Inferential modesty, informational parsimony, and the nomological 
hypothesis 
Our version of Occam’s Razor requires us to assume that the symmetries of our system 
are given by a maximal symmetry monoid consistent with our total nomological 
evidence E (a superset of W). Under natural assumptions, at least one maximal 
consistent monoid will indeed exist.84 However, there may be more than one. In this 
case, we need a criterion to choose one maximal symmetry monoid rather than another. 
We now develop such a criterion.   
Let us begin with an example. Consider a very simple temporally evolving system, 
where the set T of times contains only a single element. So, histories can be identified 
with states at that single time; this expositional simplification has no substantive 
consequences. Suppose that the state of the system is described by a two-dimensional 
grid of zeros and ones, which is infinite in every direction. Let X be the set of all 
logically possible grids of this kind. Then the set H of all logically possible histories 
can be identified with X. In this system, one elementary kind of nomological constraint 
is one that constrains the values of one or more cells, for example the constraint “in any 
possible history, the cell (2,3) must have the value zero”.85 Suppose we have obtained 
evidence that any possible history must satisfy the constraints shown in Figure 1. This 
evidence would be represented by the subset E of H consisting of all single-period 
                                               
83 Formally, E = y-1(E′) ∩ WN and D = y-1(D′) ∩ WN. 
84 For example, if (i) H has a topology, (ii) E is a compact subset of H, and (iii) all the transformations in 
question are continuous, then Zorn’s lemma implies the existence of a maximal consistent monoid.   
85 Formally, this constraint corresponds to the set E = {h Î H : h(2,3) = 0}. Of course, we have chosen 
this rather artificial example only for expositional simplicity. Typically, we would be interested not so 
much in nomological constraints on single coordinates, but in constraints on the relationships between 
two or more coordinates, such as the constraint “No two adjacent cells can both contain a zero”. 
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histories in which the grid coincides with Figure 1 in all non-empty cells. For the sake 
of argument, let us treat E as our total nomological evidence about the system. 
 : : : : : :  
...  1     ... 
...       ... 
...  1     ... 
...  1     ... 
...    0 0  ... 
...  1     ... 
 : : : : : :  
Figure 1 
Now, for any integer n, let ynà be the transformation that shifts the entire grid to the 
right by n spaces.86 Let Yà :={ …, y–1à, y0à, y1à, y2à,...} denote the monoid of all 
such horizontal shifts. Meanwhile, let yná be the transformation that shifts the entire 
grid upwards by n spaces, and let Yá :={ …, y–1á, y0á, y1á, y2á,...} denote the monoid 
of all such vertical shifts. Consider two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: All transformations in Yà are symmetries of the system. 
Hypothesis 2: All transformations in Yá are symmetries of the system. 
The evidence represented in Figure 1 is consistent with either of these hypotheses. 
However, it cannot accommodate both simultaneously. If Hypothesis 1 were true, then 
the constraints in Figure 1 would entail the constraints shown in Figure 2. If Hypothesis 
2 were true, then they would entail the constraints shown in Figure 3. In each figure, 
the constraints that were part of the initial nomological evidence are highlighted in 
boldface; extrapolated constraints (based on the postulated symmetries) appear in non-
bold font. Clearly, Hypotheses 1 and 2 cannot both be true, since they yield mutually 
contradictory constraints on the values of the grey cells. 
 : : : : : :  
... 1 1 1 1 1 1 ... 
...       ... 
... 1 1 1 1 1 1 ... 
... 1 1 1 1 1 1 ... 
... 0 0 0 0 0 0 ... 
... 1 1 1 1 1 1 ... 
 : : : : : :  
Figure 2 
                                               
86 Of course, if n is negative, then ynà is actually a shift to the left. 
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 : : : : : :  
...  1  0 0  ... 
...  1  0 0  ... 
...  1  0 0  ... 
...  1  0 0  ... 
...  1  0 0  ... 
...  1  0 0  ... 
 : : : : : :  
Figure 3 
Let Y be some maximal consistent monoid of transformations that we postulate as the 
symmetry monoid, in accordance with Occam’s Razor. Hypothesis 1 then asserts that 
Yà Í Y, while Hypothesis 2 asserts that Yá Í Y. Since both hypotheses cannot 
simultaneously be true, it follows that there are at least two distinct ways in which we 
could specify Y: one including Yà and another including Yá. So even in this very 
simple example, there is no unique maximal consistent monoid. 
At first sight, the choice between these two maximal symmetry monoids seems 
arbitrary. But it is not. To see this, note that both hypotheses could have entailed the 
same constraints they did, using less initial evidence. For example, Hypothesis 1 would 
have entailed the same constraints from the weaker evidence represented in Figure 4. 
 : : : : : :  
...  1     ... 
...       ... 
...  1     ... 
...  1     ... 
...    0   ... 
...  1     ... 
 : : : : : :  
Figure 4 
The original evidence in Figure 1 constrained six cell values (i.e., six “bits” of 
information). But Hypothesis 1 can make do with only five of them (in particular, the 
second zero is redundant). Meanwhile, Hypothesis 2 would have entailed the same 
constraints from only three bits of information, as represented in Figure 5. 
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 : : : : : :  
...       ... 
...       ... 
...       ... 
...       ... 
...    0 0  ... 
...  1     ... 
 : : : : : :  
Figure 5 
In other words, Hypothesis 2 could have entailed all of its original constraints, using 
less information than Hypotheses 1 needed to obtain its original constraints. Thus 
Hypothesis 2 can be viewed as more informationally parsimonious than Hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 2 stands out in another way too: from the same initial evidence, it constrains 
fewer cell values than Hypothesis 1. So, Hypothesis 2 is also more inferentially modest 
than Hypothesis 1.  
This simple example illustrates two general points. First, different symmetry monoids 
may lead to different nomological hypotheses – hypotheses about what the 
nomologically possible histories are – even starting from the same body of nomological 
evidence. Formally, we may have W(Y1,E) ¹ W(Y2,E) where Y1 and Y2 are two distinct 
symmetry monoids that are each consistent with E. Second, one symmetry monoid 
could generate the same nomological hypothesis from two different bodies of 
nomological evidence. Formally, we may have W(Y,E1) ¹ W(Y,E2) for the same 
symmetry monoid Y and two distinct sets E1 and E2. 
Thus, given two symmetry monoids Y1 and Y2, which are each compatible with the 
same total nomological evidence E, we can compare them along two dimensions: 
Inferential modesty: If W(Y2,E) Í W(Y1,E), then we say that Y1 is (at 
least weakly) more inferentially modest than Y2. 
Informational Parsimony: Let E1 be the largest superset87 of E such that 
W(Y1,E1) = W(Y1,E). Let E2 be the largest superset of E such that W(Y2,E2) 
= W(Y2,E). If E2 Í E1, then we say that Y1 is (at least weakly) more 
informationally parsimonious than Y2. 
Returning to our earlier example with the infinite grid, let E be the nomological 
evidence described by Figure 1. Then W(Yà,E) is the set of single-period histories 
satisfying the constraints described by Figure 2, and W(Yá,E) is the corresponding set 
for Figure 3. Meanwhile, if Eà is the nomological evidence described by Figure 4, then 
we have W(Yà,Eà) = W(Yà,E). Likewise, if Eá is the nomological evidence described 
by Figure 5, then we have W(Yá,Eá) = W(Yá,E). 
                                               
87 Recall that larger subsets of H encode less information. In particular, if E1 is a superset of E, then E1 
encodes less information than E. 
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In this example, neither W(Yà,E) nor W(Yá,E) includes the other, so neither monoid is 
more inferentially modest than the other, according to our definition. Likewise, neither 
Eà nor Eá includes the other, so neither monoid is more informationally parsimonious. 
So our formal definitions up to this point are not sensitive enough to capture the 
plausible intuition that Yá is both more inferentially modest and more informationally 
parsimonious than Yà.  
One possible way of capturing this intuition is to use concepts from information theory, 
such as entropy. To do this, we must introduce a prior probability distribution Pr0 on 
the set H of all logically possible histories. In the example with the infinite grid, this 
could be the uniform Bernoulli distribution, which treats all the cells in the grid as 
independent, identically distributed random variables, where zero and one each appear 
with probability ½. Given two different symmetry monoids Y1 and Y2 that are 
consistent with the same nomological evidence E, we can use Pr0 to compare them: 
Inferential modesty (relative to Pr0): If Pr0(W(Y2,E)) £ Pr0(W(Y1,E)), 
then we say that Y1 is (at least weakly) more inferentially modest than Y2, 
relative to Pr0. 
Informational Parsimony (relative to Pr0): Let E1 be the largest superset 
of E such that W(Y1,E1) = W(Y1,E). Let E2 be the largest superset of E such 
that W(Y2,E2) = W(Y2,E). If Pr0(E2) £ Pr0(E1), then we say that Y1 is (at 
least weakly) more informationally parsimonious than Y2, relative to Pr0.  
Do these criteria enable us to prefer Yá to Yà, as intuition suggests? Let us begin with 
the second criterion. Comparing Figures 4 and 5, we see that Pr0(Eà) = 2–5, whereas 
Pr0(Eá) = 2–3, and so Yá is indeed more informationally parsimonious than Yà, relative 
to the uniform Bernoulli distribution. The first criterion, by contrast, does not help. 
Comparing Figures 2 and 3, we see that Pr0(W(Yà,E)) and Pr0(W(Yá,E)) are each zero, 
because they constrain an infinite number of cells. So, they do not differ in inferential 
modesty relative to Pr0. They do differ in more sensitive measures of inferential 
modesty, computed using more advanced notions from information theory, such as 
“entropy density”. But the details are beyond the scope of this paper. 
Note that, if Y1 is more inferentially modest than Y2 in the original sense, which did 
not refer to any prior probability, then Y1 is more inferentially modest than Y2 in the 
information-theoretic sense, relative to any prior Pr0. This is because if 
W(Y2,E) Í W(Y1,E), then Pr0(W(Y2,E)) £ Pr0(W(Y1,E)). Likewise, if Y1 is more 
informationally parsimonious than Y2 in the original sense, then Y1 is more 
informationally parsimonious than Y2 in the new sense, relative to any prior Pr0. The 
reason is that if E2 Í E1, then Pr0(E2) £ Pr0(E1). 
Appendix D: Spatial distance in quantum mechanical systems 
In Section 3.9, we proposed a definition of the distance between two regions R and R′ 
in space, based on the minimum time required for a “signal” to travel from R to R′. As 
we have already observed, this definition is not entirely satisfactory in systems where 
signals can travel at arbitrarily high speeds (such as classical mechanics). This is 
particularly problematic in quantum mechanics, for two reasons. 
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First, there is the well-known phenomenon of entanglement, where two particles, 
perhaps separated by a large spatial distance, can apparently correlate their behaviour. 
But, in fact, this is less of a problem than it first appears. Rather than interpreting 
entanglement as “spooky action at a distance”, we can interpret it as a sign that we have 
not correctly specified the space S for this spatially extended system. A three-
dimensional quantum system with n particles is not a collection of n wave functions on 
a three-dimensional space; rather, it should be viewed as a single wave function on a 
3n-dimensional space. So, we should define S = R3n. Even if two particles appear 
widely “separated” from our three-dimensional perspective, their joint location is 
described by a single “hump” of the wave function in a six-dimensional space.88 From 
this perspective, the entangled behaviour of the two particles does not appear as a non-
local phenomenon.  
However, there is a more fundamental problem, which affects even a single-particle 
quantum system. Solutions to the Schrödinger equation on unbounded domains 
generally have full support: they give non-zero probability to every part of the space. 
This means, in effect, that the particle has a non-zero probability (albeit tiny) of 
“jumping” arbitrarily large distances through space.89 Thus, no two regions of space 
are ever unreachable from one another in any time duration, no matter how short, and 
so the distance between any two regions will be zero, according to the definition given 
in Section 3.9. 
To address this problem, we must introduce a slightly more nuanced version of 
“unreachability”. Let e > 0 be some small “error tolerance”. Given three events E, F, 
and G in W, we say that E and G are e-conditionally independent given F, if
1–e < PrF(E∩G) / PrF(E)×PrF(G) < 1+e. In other words, the conditional probability 
PrF(E∩G) is “almost” the same as the product PrF(E)×PrF(G), which means that E and 
G are “almost” conditionally independent, given F. If R and R′ are two regions of S, 
and t > t0, then we say that R′ is e-unreachable from R in time t if, for any h in W, any 
event which happens in R′ at time t is e-conditionally independent of any event which 
happens in R at time t0, given the event [hRC´{t0}]. If e is small, this means that, with very 
high probability, a signal which originates in R at time t0 cannot reach R′ before time t. 
We then define the e-distance between R and R′ to be the supremum of the set of all t 
such that R′ is e-unreachable from R in time t (if this supremum exists). 
By using a small but non-zero e, we can thus define a non-trivial notion of e-distance 
between different regions of space, even in a quantum-mechanical system. This 
measure of distance will obviously depend on the value of e, but it will roughly 
approximate the “classical” notion of distance. However, a detailed development of this 
approach is beyond the scope of this paper. 
                                               
88 We are being slightly imprecise here; in quantum mechanics, particles do not even have precisely 
specified locations. 
89 Again, we are being somewhat imprecise in even ascribing a particular “location” to the particle. The 
Fourier transform of the wave function also has full support; this means that any velocity for the particle, 
no matter how large, has a tiny but non-zero probability of being realized. 
